Notes on the Work of Heritage in the Age of Archaeological Reproduction[1]

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> This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such a violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. (Benjamin 1968a: 257–58).

I remember clearly conversations that I had in 1988 with tour guides, archaeologists, vendors, and other "heritage workers" at Chichén Itzá regarding the efforts of the Mexican government to have Chichén named a World Heritage site by UNESCO. No one had any clear understanding of what these efforts consisted of, who was behind them, or what would result from them. Nonetheless, we were all excited by the promise that this would not only bring more tourism, but maybe even funding for a variety of development projects that would make Chichén Itzá and the nearby Maya communities more respectable, attractive, modern, and protected. When the newspapers finally did announce the successful placement of this internationally famous ruins of a Maya city on the UNESCO list of World Heritage, the news effervesced like a freshly opened bottle of carbonated water. After a few days, however, the bubbles had dissipated and the news went flat with no tangible results or effects of any type to be seen or felt for many years to come. In fact, I am not sure that anyone who lives and works in Chichén Itzá would be able to identify with absolute certainty any direct material or immediately tangible consequences that have derived from this international recognition. The exception may be those upper level administrators in the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH) who were involved in the efforts to have Chichén placed on the UNESCO list and those directly involved in managing and maintaining this site on the list. Perhaps some of the archaeologists that have been involved in excavation and restoration at the site beginning about 1994—that is, eight years after the initial listing may have some specific knowledge of the how these projects and their funding are connected to the UN ESCO listing as an expression of broader governmental strategies of maintaining Chichén as World Heritage and further developing it as *heritage*. While there is very little overt evidence of the UNESCO status, there is, on the other hand, perhaps, not any "thing" there that is not in some way connected to the fact and process of Chichén Itzá being heritage. As for me, I hardly *see* "heritage"—neither Maya heritage, nor Mexican heritage, much less world heritage—when I visit the ruins. In fact, it is only in the last three years, that I have begun to comprehend and to conceptualize the ruins of Chichén in terms of heritage, that is, as a problem and process of heritage. This raises a series of questions, the most important for this commentary concerns the nature of heritage that allows it to be

both "seen" as objects and in locations where *heritage is not* and, in other places, remain invisible to the naked eye even when heritage is in fact *there*.[2]

This somewhat puzzling and contradictory situation that I have sketched, and to which I return below, allows me to draw out some crucial characteristics of heritage that I believe are significant. These contrary and elusive attributes can help us make sense of the three distinct conceptualizations of heritage that are presented by the authors of the chapters in this section.

Smith argues that heritage is a mode of governmentality, that is, a strategy of control and management of "heritage."[3] This implies, even presupposes, that archaeology is deeply interconnected with heritage, even though the force of Smith's argument is to analyze the conflicted tensions between the past constructed as an archaeologically managed heritage and the past pre-given as a heritage whose authentic meaning is constituted by indigenous values. Benavides is not at all concerned with the management of material heritage; instead he focuses on discourses, symbolic value, knowledge, and meanings of heritage, which archaeology, archaeologists, the state, and indigenous groups struggle to shape and control. Although these two essays present overtly different conceptualizations of heritage to analyze quite distinct socio-ethnographic situations, their shared perspective and commonality in approach is revealed when contrasted to the chapter by Matthews and Palus. The latter assert that archaeology and heritage are antagonistically opposed and disjunctive. Underlying this proposition is the idea that heritage is like culture and is a manifestation or expression of a "culture" of a social group.

Heritage, for Matthews and Palus, is, therefore, not at all a strategy but real, material, and meaningful bundle of things that constitute at least part of "the past" of a cultural community. This is not to say that there is not a "theory" embedded within this latter mode of heritage in this view heritage is not a strategy but the goals, objects, objectives, and means of strategies that have a rightful relation of use and ownership over their past. Further, any and all social groups must have, do have, and have a right to have *their* heritage so as to maintain the integrity of *their* culture and identity: Heritage references discernible culture*s* (cultural communities in the plural). In short the three authors present three visions of heritage: heritage as a management toolkit of social sciences (Smith), heritage as a field of contested interpretations (Benavides), and heritage as a practical materiality lived and experienced on the ground (Matthews and Palus). By clarifying the points of difference and overlap between these three views, I chart my own conceptualization of heritage.

This divergence in conceptualizations of heritage should compel us to ask about the history of heritage. Specifically, why and when did heritage become such a widespread, necessary and compelling concept by which anthropologists—as well as a variety of other social scientists and non-governmental organization workers—began to investigate what had previously been understood and experienced as "culture"? While this is too large and complicated a topic to do anything more than simply point to a crucial point of departure for such an investigation. Specifically, I suggest UNESCO, which has devoted considerable energy in its various proclamations over the last three decades to identify, extract, adjudicate, and define a practical logic of heritage is the place to begin.

A close inspection of the UNESCO statements no doubt illustrate a shift in the conception of heritage even as a fundamental continuity is maintained. The conventions on World Heritage (1972) and Intangible Heritage (2003) quite clearly reveal that these

international legal instruments define heritage as anything and everything that anthropologists have understood for more than a century as the elements, forms, pieces, building blocks and components of culture and cultures.   The 2003 Convention certainly reads like a 21st century elaboration and explanation of Tylor's 1871 definition of culture. There are however, two major theoretical-conceptual differences that reference a sea-change in meaning and context of usage. First, Tylor defined culture as a replacement "civilization" but still in the singular as universal and universalizing whereas UNESCO defines heritage in terms of individuated and particularizing expressions of a group or community—that is, in a word, culture*s* in the plural. [4] Second, Tylor's critical innovation to the notion of culture is the identification of a complex holism as the force of unification and integration of otherwise disjunctive cultural elements whereas UNESCO's distinctive transformation of the notion of culture into heritage is the radical stripping away of holism, integration, unity, coherence, consistency, logico-meaningful harmony that leaves only identity and rights as the unique rationality of heritage. Tylor says that "Culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, arts, morals, law, custom *and any other capabilities and habits* acquired by man as a member of society." UNESCO:

> Article 2.#1. The "intangible cultural heritage" means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts (sic) and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. For the purposes of this Convention, consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible with existing international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable development. (UNESCO 2003: Article 2 "definitions" (#1-2); see also UNESCO 1972: Article 1, "definitions".)

UNESCO's definitions, here and elsewhere, quite adamantly exclude the conceptualizations of 100 plus years of anthropological theorization about how the multiple and disparate pieces are meaningfully, functionally, logically, politically, economically, socially or otherwise *necessarily* integrated into *a whole*. Heritage as constituted by UNESCO criteria is, instead, the fragments, splinters, and debris that remain after one removes any type of theorization of holism, integration, coherence, or unity. Thus, whereas anthropology created the concept-practice of culture as a way to theorize integration/holism of "culture/s" and to break down the universality (singularity) of civilization, UNESCO in 2003, on the other hand, created the practice-concept of heritage as a way to break away from and dissipate the assumptions of a necessary holism within the concept of culture. As anthropologists have been asking themselves for nearly 20 years now, what remains of the concept of culture if you erase the coherence, integration and unity?   Here the question, however, is *why* erase this holism?

If we position ourselves along side Walter Benjamin who envisions history through the figure of the Angel of History (see epigraph above), we can begin to deepen our understanding of why "heritage" has so often replaced "culture" as the term of reference in

archaeological discourse, public debate, policy formation, and international intergovernmental discussions. Benjamin construes history as a continuous catastrophe that keeps on accumulating wreckage which the Angel of History looks upon as "he" relentlessly moves into the future while facing backwards at the ever-growing pile of debris, i.e., the "past." The "catastrophe" in this analogy is the continuous critique of the holism of culture, the irrefutable demise of essentialism, the endless hybridization of identity, the proliferation of split and divided subjectivities, and the defrocking of multiculturalism as strategies of control and consumer diversification. What remains are fragments and shards of cultural wholes that have no unassailable transcendent or even immanent logic of re-integration. Heritage, emerges in other words, as a tactic for the re-assemblage of cultural identity in the aftermath of postmodernism, postcolonialism, multiculturalism, and the New World Order.[5] To return to my question posed above, why the erasure of holism within this turn from culture to heritage? The answer is to clearly identified in the language of the last sentence of the UNESCO quote above: Heritage, via the "compatible existing international human rights instruments," functions to manage and govern—i.e., "legislates"—identity especially in the context of "the requirements of mutual respect …and sustainable development."

The application of Benjamin's quote to archaeology reveals even further significance. Thus, if we substitute the holism, unity, essentialism, and so on of culture for the historical "chain of events" in the above quote, then a curious understanding is revealed: We might very well recognize that we seek to be "the angel [of Heritage who] would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed" (Benjamin 1969:258). When I say "we" I refer to all of us who participate in the activity of heritage management, dispute, litigation, claims, interpretation, protection—that is, all of us archaeologists, aborigines, UNESCO heritage administrators, cultural resource managers, anthropologists, indigenous groups, citizens of Eastport, international lawyers, and heritage NGOs—who would like to recuperate the "past" as heritage in order to re-establish the integrity, propriety, and proper ownership—if not also the integrative unity—of culture, identity, and belonging via the concept and diverse practices of heritage. Certainly, the archaeological impulse to investigate, know, and restore the historical pasts of humanity in general and of particular specific societies in particular is evidence enough of this nostalgic desire to make the present "whole" the present moment by reunifying it to a resuscitated past.[6] In turn, all the various disaggregating techniques that seek to document, classify, quantify, and otherwise isolate artifacts and data (that is, the archaeological record) is ultimately always subordinated to the larger project of constituting wholes, holistic entities that can be set into series and these into hierarchies of series—styles, typologies, horizons, sites, regions, city-states, societies, civilizations, human civilization.

Matthews and Palus explicitly acknowledge this motivation and ideal in their vision and use of heritage as the material expressions of proper identity that properly belongs to each unique cultural group versus to a universalized humanity. Thus, as already noted, they oppose heritage and archaeology, the latter which, they are correct to point out, emerges as a Western discipline that tends to transform the particular pasts of distinct groups into the legacy of a generalized human civilization. When archaeology is so able to universalize heritage—that is, reconstitute it as part and parcel of a unitary modernity belonging to "everyone"—then its "authentic" nature as the property of particular cultures and social groups is radically diminished if not entirely denied. This oppositional logic that makes

"heritage" and "archaeology" antinomies is also evident in Smith's theorization of heritage as "governmentality" a la Foucault's concept: for although "archaeology" and "heritage" are conceptualized as interlinked processes via governmentality, Smith's application of governmentality pre-supposes that there is a heritage-past that is outside of the hegemony of strategic resource management that is in some sense authentic aboriginal and untainted by Western science (Smith, this chapter; cf. Smith 2004).

To point out this "contradiction" is not to critique Smith, so much as at identify this duplicity in heritage as irreducible. Heritage in a loose, non-theoretical, non-analytical sense, is indeed the property of a cultural community as its rightfully inherited past. Yet, heritage is a strategy of power uniquely in the hands of archaeology as a tool of state control and technology of governance of cultural minorities through the shaping of identity-belonging. Thus, I wish actually to extend her argument, building as it does from Foucault, in order to suggest a more pervasive mode of power. By coining the term "heritage-power" along the lines of the Frenchman's well-known notion of bio-power we can begin to think about and investigate heritage in new ways such that we make use of it instead of it simply using us. Despite the Foucaultian basis of Smith's theorizing heritage, there is a lingering leftist-Marxian or Weberian assumption of domination whereby power, or more precisely, heritage as a strategy of power (governmentality), is wielded exclusively by the dominant and *not* by the subordinated. Foucault's notion of power, and thus of strategies such as governmentality, eschews the idea that power is something that can be possessed and that it works only in a top-down fashion (Foucault 1980, 1991a, b, c; Gordon 1991; Rose 1989; Rose 1996; Hindess 1996).

It is this significant caveat to the analysis of heritage as a mode of governmentality that Benavides offers. In his chapter, Benavides implicitly argues that the management of heritage discourses of identity is not simply a weapon of "the strong" that is only and always possessed and wielded by the state, science, or other hegemonic institutions. Heritage, as a strategy of power by which to manage the past and to generate narratives of identity, is available for diverse social agents to exercise. Thus, in the Ecuadorian case that Benavides analyzes, archaeological heritage is a resource and strategy for producing discourses of identity by agents invested in the national project and by those involved in the indigenous movement. Certainly there are differential access to the use and effectiveness of the exercise of this heritage-power. But just as indubitably, heritage is available as a strategy for those that accede—willingly or with friction and resistance—to the conditions and dynamics of its deployment.

Here, and in line with Foucault's notions of strategy and power, specifically bio-power, I refer to the necessary transformations in the subject positioning and mode of subjectivity of those who enter the field of contestation in which heritage is generated, managed, and disputed. It is this effectiveness in shifting aspects of subjectivity that Smith points to as a significant dimension of heritage as governmentality. This logic also underlies the brief, negative reference that Matthews and Palus make regarding how archaeology, via certain kinds of outreach and engagement with publics, implicitly seeks to convert stake-holders into archaeologists or archaeological subjects, that is, subjects with the proper responsibilities, obligations, viewpoints, attitudes, identities, and habits for the assumption of ownership and management of archaeological heritage. Studies such as Castañeda (2005), Castañeda and Castillo Cocom (2002), Castillo Cocom (2002), and Breglia (2006) discuss this dimension of the work of heritage in producing the proper subjects of

archaeology in order to inherit the "stewardship" of archaeologically produced heritage. Similarly, Benavides in his chapter details a case where the indigenous movement of Ecuador has already entered into the field of power to assert themselves as proper managers and interpreters of the meaning and messages of heritage. Here, however, the indigenous groups enter the field of contestation as "undomesticated," improper subjects (from the view of science) because the meanings they assert do not comply with the Ecuadorian establishment archaeology.

In focusing on these conflicts of interpretation Benavides resolutely detours from questions of authenticity and from the task of validating any of the contradictory narratives of Ecuadorian nationalism and Indigenous Ecuadorianism. This focus on discursive appropriation—via the narrative production of the meaning—of heritage in Benavides' chapter stands in contrast to the foci of the chapters by Smith and Matthews and Palus. Smith, instead, attends to the issues of the management of heritage materials or "resources" (CRM). In turn, Matthews and Palus' focus on the fieldwork negotiation of archaeologists with stake-holders. Here then are chapters that not only conceive of heritage differently, but as one might suspect also problematize heritage as an object of study in three distinct ways. This point of difference between the chapters allows me to return to Chichén Itzá, its status as heritage, and, most importantly, the elusive nature of heritage.

To my mind, it is necessary to situate (archaeological, cultural, tangible) "heritage" in history as a phenomena that is not at all independent of archaeology, but that rather as something that exists in strict and intimate relationship to it. Indeed, I suggest that the work of heritage only begins to become what we now understand it to be in what I would call the "age of archaeological reproduction." This phrase borrows from Benjamin's (1968b) famous analysis of the work of art: He argues that the modern era's technological capacity to create identical or mimetic copies has a transformative effect on the aura of art, or what can be glossed as its attribute of uniqueness and authenticity. In adapting Benjamin's notion to heritage, I first point out that the technologies of archaeological reproduction are not restricted to the discipline and science of archaeology; rather it is an inclusive panoply of methods and techniques of preservation, conservation, protection, and restoration that are applied within a variety of practical fields, from ecology, history, environmentalism, architecture, even tourism, in order to re-create an origin/original (that is, an *archæ*) or its image. Many have cited Benjamin's quotable phrase that "aura withers away" due to this reproductive capacity. However, many studies have demonstrated that this is not actually or empirically the case; aura, authenticity, and the value of uniqueness thrives in modernity. Furthermore, in a less quoted section of his analysis, Benjamin argues not that aura "disappears," but rather that the basis of aura shifts from the holism of tradition and ritual to what he calls "politics."[7] Similarly, I suggest that the basis and nature of heritage in the age of archaeological reproduction has been undergoing a profound transformation in its conditions of possibility, that is, from relatively unproblematized "inheritance" based in relations of identity to tradition to politicized construction of identity and cultural ownership in contexts of capitalism.

An interesting point about the etymology of the word heritage is that it references inheritance, heirs, birthright, legacy, and hereditary properties. As an heir of a will or as a recipient by blood and birth, I am due to receive something materially discrete and tangible, e.g., property, juridical rights, socio-racial categorization, biogenetic material. Heritage as a sociocultural, historical, or psychological "tradition," "legacy," or "inheritance" is a mode

of property that is necessarily abstract, metaphoric, intangible, and symbolic. Thus, when heritage is questioned (or contested) in any number of ways, it requires concretization in discrete material and tangible forms that can serve as vehicles for these intangible meanings and values. Consider how a will may be contested: Not only can the property to be inherited, and the proper inheritor be contested, but also the rights of use, ownership, and stewardship may be disputed. It is in this space of contestation that archaeology has intervened in order to concretize "the past" as heritage.

This concretization or materialization occurs in a multitude of ways. The most obvious are archaeological reports filled with narrative and visual re-constructions, educational archaeology films made for student consumers, and the physical-material "reconstruction" of sites for tourism. It is precisely the space of the material and media of these concretizations that can be disputed by stake-holders by questioning the means, process, meanings, methods, and results of recreating the past in material forms. The locus of contestation however tend to be distributed around the three forms of heritage that I discuss below in this chapter.

As an ethnographer of archaeology—that is, as one who investigates archaeology ethnographically, using ethnography—I am fascinated by the way archaeology creates reality. I find it significant that there is a key difference between the archaeological reproduction of the past and what Benjamin analyzed as the mimetic copying of modern technologies such as photography. Put simply, archaeology invents complex representations of the past that are not mimetic, but that only appear—and not always to everyone, of course—as if they were faithfully identical copies and transparent mimetic representations of the past. As I have argued elsewhere (Castañeda 1996) they are forms of hyper-reality (Eco 1990) and simulacra (Baudrillard 19).[8]

To get at the significance of this, consider one of the primary truisms taught in introductory archaeology classes: Archaeology destroys the past in its process of investigation; that is, the possibility of retrieving information and even the materiality of the past is destroyed through specific methodologies of knowledge production. We may note, therefore, that this is one among several reasons why, even in cases where there is restoration, the resulting ruins—which often take form as life-size, scale model "replicas" of cities or settlements—are never identical to any actual past. The creation of archaeological sites, whether or not restored for visitation, is always fashioning of a contemporary vision of the past that seeks to transparently represent that past. More to the point of this commentary is the following: The premise that archaeology destroys the past even as it salvages specific elements of that totality, even as it may create a material representation of that past, leads to a concept that is fundamental to the scientific agenda. Specifically, to operationalize the production and accumulation of knowledge on the basis of methodologies that contaminate and/or permanently destroy the materiality of the past and the possibility of further knowledge, requires the concept of "archaeological record." The "archaeological record" comprises not just the raw, material, disjunctive and fragmentary remains of the past, but also the full gamut of fieldnotes, drawings, photographs, measurements, descriptions, analyses, and recordings created by archaeologists as the documentation of data, that is, "data" itself or per se. The archaeological record is the unity of fragmentary materiality of the "past" and the first level discursive production about this materiality. It is this unification that is presented as the object to be explained and analyzed by archaeological interpretations: This is the "whole" that the archaeologists as "angels of

heritage" must constitute in order to actualize higher level constructions of "the past" into more abstract models of "whole" societies and cultures.

Without in any way suggesting a philosophical opposition between mind and matter, it seems analytically useful to recognize, investigate and engage these three forms or registers "of heritage." These three are the material fragments of the past, the archaeological inscription of this materiality as data, and the interpretation of the archaeological past. Even in cases where there is overlap and intersection of these three forms, each presents rather distinct fields of power, contestation, knowledge, and practice. By way of illustrating this point, we can consider, once again, differences in the three chapters. Each of these I suggest can be viewed as having analyzed the field of political contestation that is defined and organized by the problems posed by one of these forms of heritage. Smith's analysis of the management of cultural resources as governmentality is situated in the problem of the control of the materiality of the archaeological record—that is that part of the record that consists of the disjunctive series of object-fragments of the past. Her analysis of how CRM as governmentality impinges on indigenous rights and ownership of heritage in this first register definitely points toward, but is not about the conflicts of interpretation and meaning of archaeological heritage. Matthews and Palus' discussion of the fieldwork negotiation between archaeologists and stakeholders is centrally focused on the struggle to define the status and constitution of archaeological data out of the fragmentary materiality of the past (or what is called "resources" in Smith). Similarly this focus on the constitution of archaeological data (the second form of heritage) implicates but really does not address the conflicts in the other two registers of heritage. In turn, Benavides' attention to the competing narratives and discourses by which the past is interpreted as meaningful directly targets the problem of heritage as the politics of knowledge (production). What is at stake for Benavides is the politics and problem of the interpretation and meaning of archaeological heritage, not the conflicts over archaeological record, that is, heritage in either form or register of material resources or data production.

Each of these focal points and their attendant analyses emerge from the empirical situation itself. In other words, the analyses are not imposed "from above" by the dictates of some (high) theory. Rather, they focus on what the authors view as the significant issues and debates within the context in which they are working. Each gives priority to one of the three specific forms or registers of heritage (material resources, scientific data, interpreted knowledge of the past) that I have identified. From these three registers of heritage, we have three different logics of or strategies for analysis. In targeting and focusing on one of these three registers of the problem of heritage, the analyses necessarily cut transecting lines into relevant issues relating to problems in the investigation of the other forms. However, given both the empirical contexts and the differing points of departure for these analyses, the questions and issues that are raised are distinct and do not necessarily lead toward any specific direction. To put it simply, the conflicts over the meaning and production of historical interpretations of the archaeological past do not have any *necessary a priori* relationship—perhaps even no relationship at all in certain situations—to the management and negotiation of resources and archaeological data. The negotiation of data does not connect in any *pre-determined* way to either the control and production of broader interpretive narratives nor to governmental strategies of controlling the materiality of the archaeological record. The regulation and refashioning of subjectivities and identities in relation to the management of the material past *does not correlate to any particular type of*

conflicts in either the interpretive production of narratives of the past or the constitution and status of archaeological data. How these three forms or registers of heritage are interconnected as spaces, objects and fields of conflict is variable according to the historical specificity of each situation. The logic and agenda of analyses must be attuned to this contextual particularity of the specific cases under investigation. The value and insights of these three chapters, including their differences to each other, are due in fact to this kind of close inspection to the ethnographic materials.

This last clarification brings my "notes" back around to its point of departure to reconsider the status of heritage at Chichén Itzá and to my own research projects that present a different formulation of these issues. My early research (Castañeda 1996, 2001) was designed as an ethnographic and historical study of the invention of Chichén Itzá as an archaeological site and as a tourist destination. One focus of my study was the discursive and textual content of knowledge produced about the Maya and Chichén in order to link anthropological understandings to particular discourses of identity, belonging and visions of the Maya, specifically, and of México, generally. A second focus of my research was the study of the on the ground activities and practices that constituted the politics of tourism at the site. Reflecting on my studies from the vantage point of contemporary concerns in archaeology, one can recognize two distinct yet intertwined objects of study, neither of which at the time did I ever conceptualize as "heritage" per se (in an untheorized sense) or as typically understood in public and academic parlance.   To be clear, I had been concerned until just recently with "ruins" (that is, material elements construed as derived from the past) and the infusion of these objects and spaces with meanings, values, identities, narratives, symbols for purposes of constituting national and subnational identities, histories, and belongings. As a way to gain analytical distance and currency on the politics and conceptions of the archaeological past, I used "ruins" where the native term was, in Spanish, *patrimonio*. Interestingly, *patrimonio* translates into English as either "patrimony" or as "heritage" depending on context and the particular meanings one wishes to convey. It can be theoretically and methodologically useful to exploit the semantic difference between these two English words that are folded together within the Spanish word to identify two modalities (not forms) of heritage.

Recall that I have identified three forms or registers of heritage and suggested these three forms as key concepts. These are heritage in form/register of materiality, data, and interpretation. Each of these can be types of objects but also spaces and fields of contention, practices of control and use, as well as politics and juridical legislation. Now, I want to differentiate two modalities of heritage, that is two strategies by which *heritage forms* are shaped into objects, means, and targets of struggle. In the first, heritage is a strategy of identity. In the second, heritage is a strategy of governmentality. Allow me to explain.

One the one hand, my research implicitly formulated the study of Chichén Itzá, that is, the archaeological patrimony of Chichén, as a mode of what Geertz long ago called "primordial origins." Geertz used this term to designate six types of resources for imagining nation, building national community and forging shared belonging. In this framework, the symbols and images of the nation are constructed out of a motivated selection of the materials given by history, religion, geography, tradition, and so on. Archaeological patrimony is not one of Geertz' types of "primordial origin" yet it is interesting because it cross-cuts his categories in a unique way. It is a resource and a strategy to construct and imagine "nation" (and therefore, "national modernity"), that is generated—concretely

materialized, shaped, and disseminated—via the sciences of archaeology and anthropology (with ancillary help from associated sciences). In other words, whereas Geertz' primordial origins are in some sense inherent to community as lived practices, customs, traditions, and values, the significance of archaeological patrimony for national identity formation is that it is constructed *outside* of the quotidian, experiential life of a community by expert-knowledge producers. The interpretive content of this knowledge is reformulated into narratives of and master debates about the nation as unified, modern community of identity and belonging. This modality of "heritage" is what I want to differentiate as patrimony or patrimony-heritage from the notion of heritage discussed at length in this commentary as governmentality.

On the other hand, my research tracked the politics of tourism that arose at the tourist site of the archaeological city of Chichén. I conducted participant observation and study of the ongoing politics of tourism in relation to both community factionalism and the governmental politics of the state. This focus on tourism as the object of study through the lens of politics was not conceptualized as the study of the politics of heritage. It would be easy and tempting (perhaps, even congratulatory) to say that on hindsight I was in effect studying heritage, or the "politics of heritage." Here I return to my opening story to suggest instead that Chichén was not yet *patrimonio* in the mode of "heritage"—that is, a strategy of governing (governmentality) and a panoply of managing practices. Archaeological ruins of México were not really "heritage" except in the most mundane sense of *uncontested* forms of an archaeological record (materiality and data). Due to the absence of the contestation of these forms of heritage, heritage was "invisible" or implicit. The politics that I studied ethnographically—that is, the struggle of different agents of differing scale (handicraft vendors, tour guides, community organizations, local entrepreneurs, private capital, state and federal government institutions) to control, use and regulate the archaeological and tourism site of Chichén—was a politics *of tourism*, not *heritage politics*.

The period of my fieldwork, as previously noted, was the time when the federal government was negotiating with UNESCO to obtain World Heritage status for Chichén; that negotiation was definitively a heritage politics. Further, after México had only begun to transform its archaeological *patrimonio* into archaeological heritage after signing onto the UNESCO World Heritage Convention in 1984. However, the struggles of community groups, state agencies, private capital, and others was a struggle to regulate and control tourism—that is, the flow, trajectory, spaces, timetables, messages, and consumption practices of tourists. These diverse negotiations and conflicts provoked crises that in fact triggered the emergence of heritage in the sense (modality) of governmental strategies of management that previously did not exist in this location of archaeological patrimony. In fact, it is clear that these struggles and the ongoing crises in which they have culminated were enabled by the fact of the near absolute absence of on the ground strategies and practices for the management of the ruins as heritage (Castañeda 1996, 1998, 2000, 2005a, 2005b).

What my study thereby documents in some measure is the ongoing process of the historical emergence of heritage as a governmentality in the management of Chichén. Consider that as late as the fall of 2005, a new position was created by México's National Institute of Anthropology and History to oversee all dimensions of tourism, archaeological excavation, restoration, conservation, and facility management at Chichén. On July 12, 2006, Dr. Eduardo Perez was appointed to this position and, in an interview (personal

communication, 2006) he expressed that the fundamental priority of his role as Director is to create and implement a strategic vision and set of practices of site management. To accomplish this agenda, he is specifically pointed out the urgent need to incorporate and adapt tools of CRM as developed in the USA and Australia. These developments at Chichén are in fact part of a broader initiative by the National Institute of Anthropology and History to create new paradigmatic models of managing, governing and regulating the archaeological sites of México as heritage sites.

This ethnographic fieldwork material from Chichén suggests key conceptual guidelines by which to investigate the work of heritage. The first point is that heritage can be used in an untheorized and generic way to reference anything that comes "from the past" and that is claimed as part of one or another groups' culture and identity. Heritage in this sense is not an analytical category, much less a concept. It is simply the dictionary definition of the word. Then again, heritage can be theorized and conceptualized as a methodological tool that facilitates analyses of and active engagement with "heritage" issues, conflicts, debates, stakeholders, and publics. The question then becomes, what would be the parameters and elements of such an analytical and methodological tool? The second guideline that contributes to this goal of forging a concept of heritage is that we must, therefore, pay strict attention to the fact that not everything that appears on the surface as "heritage" or asserted as such is indeed heritage in an analytical or methodological sense. Further, not all "heritage" is heritage in the same way, with the same stakes, with the same value, and with the same politics. To create a notion of heritage that is useful to social science, including archaeological, research, the concept must not be used as a reified umbrella term that lumps variations and differences together indiscriminately. A concept of heritage, to be methodologically useful must distinguish types, forms, modes, and variations of heritage. The third guideline that I have sought to sketch here differentiates between three forms or registers of heritage as substantive content. In other words, heritage as a descriptive concept is a set of material resources, archaeological data, and discursive knowledge that comprise three distinct, yet at times overlapping and intersecting, fields of power and contestation. It is in and through these fields of power that "heritage" is identified, defined, claimed, legislated, regulated, controlled, managed, owned, used, sold, consumed, and recreated. The fourth guideline that I have discussed is an analytical concept of heritage. In this conceptualization, heritage operates in two distinct modalities, which, again, may or may not overlap and intersect in any given or empirical situation. On the one hand, heritage is a type of primordial origin that I have called "patrimony": it is a strategy and resource for narrating and imagining the nation. On the other hand, heritage is a mode of governmentality, that is, a strategic rationality and series of practices devised to manage, regulate, and control "the past" as it is manifested in the forms and types of heritage that have been discussed in these notes and in the chapters of this section.

Heritage is many things, that is, it can refer to a wide variety of phenomenon at any one time. Yet, these guidelines may help us investigate heritage by facilitating greater precision in our thinking, formulation of problems, descriptions and analyses. Instead of working like an Angel of Heritage to reconstruct a grand theoretical whole or singular master concept out of the debris and fragments of heritage, these guidelines allows us to work, perhaps more like rescue workers, in the ongoing wreckage of "the past" with analytical strategies that attend to the specificity of situations and issues, but are also in some sense coordinated with the different and intersecting research efforts of others.

Endnotes

[1] Book chapter written for publication in Lena Mortensen and Julie Hollowell, editors., Archaeologies and Ethnographies: Iterations of the Past. University of Florida Press, expected 2007-2008.

[2] The question of what triggered this shift in my own analytical perception is not a central issue for this commentary. In brief, this shift was provoked by the emergence of a local politic movement that for the first time invoked indigenous politics and cultural property rights over the archaeological site as heritage (see Castañeda 2005a, b; n.d.)

[3] In my own recent investigations of the disputed claims over the archaeological patrimony of Chichén I have also come to the idea of heritage as governmentality independently of Smith's (2004) more extensive and elaborated contribution (see Castañeda 2005a).

[4] It is important to note that the 1972 Convention on World Heritage defines cultural and natural heritage, both of which are defined as manifestations of a "universal" value. While expressing this universal significance, there is nonetheless no innate logical coherence, integration or holism that constitutes World Heritage. Heritage in popular discourse (as well as in UNESCO discourse) is or can be both universal/universalized and culturally particular or only one or the other. Sometimes these two senses are in contradiction with each other and sometimes not, as in, for example, UNESCO's universalizing conception of World Heritage and its culturally particularist notion of intangible heritage.

[5] This statement should provoke some thinking if not debate. I am expressly arguing that heritage emerges out of the critiques of the various "post" movements as an after effect of those critiques. Specifically, the strategic turn toward "heritage" is a counter-response to these critiques and is not a concept that was conceived, promoted and advocated by the post-critics. It is precisely for this reason that the concept-practice of heritage has pretty much remained under inspected, under the radar, by diverse cultural critics until very recently.

[6] See Benavides (2005) on the work of nostalgia in archaeology.

[7] This point is discussed in Castañeda (2000). By "politics" Benjamin is obliquely referring to the politics of economic basis of society, that is, the politics of capitalist markets, consumption, production, and distribution.

[8] Note, however that to argue that the reconstructed sites of archaeological heritage are hyper-reality and simulacra according to Eco and Baudrillard, respectively, directly implies that such archaeological ruins are not "ruins" in Benjamin's sense. Benjamin uses a notion of "ruins" to exemplify the idea of aura as a authentically unique presence in time and space (Castañeda 2000). Benjamin's notion of ruins is that of an origin and original that precedes copies *and is therefore not a copy*. Hyper-reality (Eco 1990) and simulacra (Baudrillard 1995) are notions based on the idea that the original—in this case, all variety of archaeological heritage and ruins—is necessarily a copy, that is, something transformed in the contemporary moment by the technologies of preservation, conservation, protection, management, and exhibition. This is further discussed in the subsequent paragraph in the body of the chapter.

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