Ethnography in the Forest: An Analysis of Ethics in the Morals of Anthropology

Quetzil E. Castañeda
The Open School of Ethnography and Anthropology

In a well-known text, an act of unscrupulous complicity in fieldwork is unabashedly confessed:

One day, when I was playing with a group of children, a little girl who had been struck by one of her playmates took refuge by my side and, with a very mysterious air, began to whisper something in my ear. As I did not understand and was obliged to ask her to repeat it several times, her enemy realized what was going on and, obviously very angry, also came over to confide what seemed to be a solemn secret. After some hesitation and questioning the meaning of the incident became clear. Out of revenge, the first little girl had come to tell me the name of her enemy, and the latter, on becoming aware of this, had retaliated by confiding to me the other’s name. From then on, it was very easy, although rather unscrupulous, to incite the children against each other and get to know all their names. After which, having created a certain atmosphere of complicity, I had little difficulty in getting them to tell me the names of the adults. When the latter understood what our confabulations were about, the children were scolded and no more information was forthcoming. [Lévi-Strauss 1992:279; emphasis added]

How scrupulous of Claude Lévi-Strauss to tell us about this impropriety in writing. Yet, in the temporal disjunction between fieldwork and representation, is there something else that is expressed here other than a confession of behavior deemed in retrospect to be unethical? Why did he tell us, putting himself “on the line” as it were? More to the point, what can it tell us about ethics and morals in anthropology and ethnography?

Through analysis of specific passages from Tristes Tropiques (1992), this article identifies key elements of an ethics that are too often missing or are only implied in anthropological discussion. Leading out from this “forest of ethics,” I consider an epistemological issue in the historiography of anthropology to draw out the significance of the difference between a historical analysis of sociopolitical processes or events and an ethical analysis of the same phenomena. This question leads me into a dialogue with Peter Pels’s (1999) history of “ethical duplexity” in anthropology in which he traces the emergence of two disjointive sets of ethical
obligations based on the anthropologist’s relationship to sponsors and to subjects of research. I draw on elements of Lévi-Strauss’s ruminations in *Tristes Tropiques* to complicate the model of ethics that Pels proposes.

In rereading the passage quoted above, I cannot help but ask: what exactly is it that Lévi-Strauss finds to be unscrupulous? What actions in this story are recognized as such, by whom, and for what reason? What scruples (are they ethical or moral?) guided, enabled, and sanctioned this self-defined act of collusion? What is the moral, ethical, cultural, scientific, sociological, and ontological difference, if any, between the treachery of little girls’ play fighting and the ethnographer’s complicity in their transgression of cultural codes?

As Lévi-Strauss reveals, there is a cultural taboo on speaking the proper names of individuals among this group of Amazonian indigenous people known as the Nambikwara. The proper name suggests the (im)possibility of a unique identification; it gives the illusion of such while nonetheless being the expression of alterity in a “system of difference.” Subjects are identified not as individuals but as social persons by naming the kinship relations that situate and define the individual within a social network. Later, Lévi-Strauss (1966) reveals the logic of this system of classification (teknonymy) as another “science of the concrete.” The transgression of the taboo on proper names is therefore a crime of culture against culture.

This offense seems likely to be one of the issues at stake. It is a double event, because first the names of the girls are revealed and then those of the adults. Yet it seems that for the Nambikwara adults this double event can be collapsed into a single transgression. For us, as readers of the text, this double event is likely to be similarly conflated, in which the ethical dilemma of action in the field is not differentiated from the question of representation of the event in ethnography. There is a risk that ethical and moral issues that happen in fieldwork are reduced to simply one judgment, one ethical matter here in the ethnographic text, as if the ethical moment of fieldwork were fully present in ethnographic representation and as if representation did not have its own ethical issues separate from fieldwork ethics. Yet this telescopic transparency into the past (the text was written 16–17 years after the event) is achieved by the flatness of the confession in the representational act of writing. In the act of writing and reading ethnography, the double event is redoubled, reiterated, and repeated. Articulated to the double event is therefore a third transgression, or its possibility, even though the secret names are themselves not revealed to the reader. An understanding of ethics—as opposed to simply and quickly making moral judgments that conceal political postures and assumptions—compels us to make a detailed analysis of the facts of the case.

On this basis, it seems pertinent to distinguish between the ethical and moral issues that arise in ethnographic fieldwork from those that inhabit ethnography as text. No doubt they are intertwined in complex ways, yet the distinction between them is useful. The questions of fieldwork point toward the immediate lived-in interactions and engagements with others. The questions of representation point to
more general problems in which others can become abstracted in generic categories (e.g., genders, tribes, races, cultures, or civilizations) and reified in notions such as the Self and Other, modernity (premodernity or postmodernity), savage minds, and “savage slots” (to borrow Trouillot’s [2003] phrase). The ethical matter in these two domains of fieldwork and representation are not absolutely different precisely because there are significant overlappings, complicated intersections, and parallels between them. To avoid their conflation, they must be analytically distinguished to understand how exactly they intersect, overlap, and reinforce each other. The story of Lévi-Strauss in the forest with little girls is a useful point of departure to analyze the difference between what I am calling the ethics of ethnography and the morals of anthropology.

Interlude—Terms and Usage

Morals and ethics are often held to be synonymous fields, problems, and issues or even two differing aspects of the same. Thus, they can be placed in a hierarchical relation in which morals refer to a larger field of imperatives, norms, rights, duties, and criteria, whereas ethics refers to the application or embodiment of these principles in action or in the evaluation of action. Thus, in this usage, the term morals references social group and ethics the individual. But, the semantic relation of these terms, as well as their hierarchical relationship, is at times reversed and inverted in both popular and social science discourses. We can speak about a person’s individual morals or the ethics of the community. This confusion is present as well in philosophy, in which either moral philosophy or ethics can be the concept term and field of study that encompasses both.

There is another tendency in philosophical discourse that does not conflate or reduce the two but positions them as distinct types of philosophical theories and as lived approaches to problems. When conceptualized in this way, the term morals refers to a normative and rule-driven framework of principles, obligations, imperatives, rights, and duties (deontics); these tend to be imbued with universal rules for application and transcendental values that are grounded in (or derived from) ontological and epistemological truths, such as Being (dasein), science, synthetic a priori, or the ultimate values of sociocultural communities, such as God or a concept of the divine. In applied ethics (also called “regional ethics” by philosophers), deontics are circumscribed by social context, but they also appeal to external criteria of value. However, nonmoral ethics (i.e., ethics in a nonmoral sense) is a situational, context-driven, relativist approach. In anthropological discussion, ethics is the umbrella term for moral and ethical problems that are usually not conceptually or practically differentiated one from the other; this enables a concomitant conflation of different types of ethics and morals, not only as theories but also as to their provenience in community, philosophy, or culture. This priority given to (situational) ethics and the commingling of ethics and morals are evident throughout the current Code of Ethics of the American Anthropological
A Double Strategy: Fieldwork with Others, Anthropology for the Other

The double event is posed in Lévi-Strauss’s story of the Nambikwara girls as an ethical issue for fieldwork: Do the first and second moments of transgression (first, allowing oneself to hear the names of the children and, second, inciting the further revelation of those of the adults) have the same value for Lévi-Strauss, for us as readers, and for the ethics of ethnography? Is the ethnographer equally involved in both transgressions? In legal crimes, intentionality is a factor to be considered in assessing guilt, but the question remains whether and how intentionality matters in crimes of culture, moral crimes, and ethical transgressions. Certainly, in the first moment, the ethnographer is complicit by accident. He is a participant-observer of something that is beyond him and his actions. He was a witness who listened.2 This facet of the event is crucial: fieldwork contingency—and, by implication, all that follows in Lévi-Strauss’s narration of the story—creates collusions and complicities in fieldwork that are not simple issues of ethics and morals; the complexity of the situation is dissimulated and concealed by a flat confession. Indeed, the elements of the ethical content—complicity, contingency, and interaction—demand more discussion of the specificity of the ethical and moral principles, criteria, and acts that are involved specifically in fieldwork versus those that are involved in anthropology (the realm of writing and theory). In the former, situational or context-driven choices and actions are at stake; in the latter, normative criteria tending toward “universal” application and general rules based in transcendent values are at stake.

In the second moment of the double event, the ethnographer admits to inciting the girls to name the names of the adults and says that this act “was rather unscrupulous.” When did he recognize it as unscrupulous—was it recognized as such in the moment of the act itself or in the moment of writing? In his representation of a later moment of retrospective reflection (as he falls asleep in the Nambikwara encampment), the little Nambikwara girls—and the Nambikwara as a whole—are framed within the horizon of the question of the non-Western Other as irreducibly innocent: “With the Nambikwara, the observer is taken back to what he might easily, but wrongly, consider to be the infancy of the human species” (Lévi-Strauss 1992:274). Their being scolded is not so much the end of their childhood, but as the moral of this travelogue relates, it suggests the end of the innocence for the Nambikwara as well as for all the other indigenous peoples that Lévi-Strauss encounters.3 Derrida makes this point as follows:

One already suspects—and all Lévi-Strauss’ writing would confirm it—that the critique of ethnocentrism, a theme so dear to the author of Tristes Tropiques, has most often the sole function of constituting the other as a model of original and natural goodness,
of accusing and humiliating oneself, of exhibiting its being-unacceptable in an anti-ethnocentric mirror . . . of a zero-degree with reference to which one could outline the structure, the growth, and above all the degradation of our society and our culture. [Derrida 1976:114–115]

Thus, despite their having been punished by the adults, the girls remain innocent—they do not know that their fighting might become a metonym of their “eventual” cultural conquest by the West (specifically Protestant Missionaries from Nebraska)—and are therefore exonerated by the ethnographer of crimes against their culture (Lévi-Strauss 1992:290–293).

However, the “knowing ethnographer” sees himself as guilty to all eyes—including his own. The scene is so saturated with colonialist expectations, masculinist privilege, and age hierarchy, as well as imbued with the insidious dualisms of mind–body, subject–object, observer–observed, how could there be any doubt as to the ethical impropriety of this enactment of crime and violence? He appears relentless, not only in transgressing the cultural taboo of the Nambikwara but also enacting the violence of representation, that is, the culture crime of anthropology and of the West. The bringing of the Nambikwara into writing and representation, especially via the disclosure, not of the names themselves, but of the taboo on using proper names is, as Derrida would have it, the “archae-violence” of logo-centric “archae-writing” (1976:112). Here, in the forest with the little girls, is the larger crime of civilization against humanity that anthropology commits against (non-Western) others who are thereby posed as the quintessential Other to Western modernity. But, in contrast to other moments in Tristes Tropiques, Lévi-Strauss seems unconcerned by the consequences of his actions.

In this story, this violence happens twice: First, in the transgression of the taboo against proper names, and second, in the transgression of the Other as a generic category. This Other is the image of a past authenticity never present in the West but which works to mirror the West in its self-formation. As such, the others that are subjects of research in fieldwork and the ideological Other that hovers in the project of anthropology do not have the same status in relation to ethics and morals. However, this difference in status is not a simple difference of binary oppositions—for example, ethics in relation to others and morals in relation to an Other—but a double articulation of contrastive operations and asymmetrical values: ethics and morals can each articulate their principles on the basis of a relation to both others and the Other. Neither is it simply the case that specific others are the ethical or moral matter of ethnographic writing and fieldwork and that the Other is in the domain of anthropology. Ethnography and anthropology can each have their ethics and morals articulated to either or both. The question of an ethical analysis is to ask precisely how these axes of problematization are given specific content and expression—how do they manifest or imply particular content and forms in ethnography and anthropology and by ethnographers and anthropologists. We need to read the subtext of the story to find answers to these queries.
Here, we must work to reconstruct the scruples—the ethical expectations and moral principles of social order—through their transgression. The moral concern for the Other is grounded in a concern for consequences; it is a macro-concern for the fate of the “people without History.” But the ethical concern for specific others in fieldwork seems to operate by a different principle. In this particular anecdote (vs. other incidents related in the book), the moral obligation to the Other of anthropology is effaced, even as its effects are visible and inhabit the ethnographic encounter as a whole and in the exoneration of the children. It does not seem to me to be present, nor even erased, however, in the specificity of the face-to-face relationship in Lévi-Strauss’s encounter with the Nambikwara girls. There is only the trace of the Other in the fieldwork encounter and in the ethnographic narrativization of that encounter. The ethics of ethnography is focused on others, here the girls. They are prioritized and privileged over a moral accounting of the Other. But what is this ethics? Without apparent thought to the consequences, Lévi-Strauss pursues his role and duty as ethnographer, that is, the project of ethnography in the grander pursuit of anthropological science. He discloses, not the actual proper names (which in any case would only be information) but knowledge (i.e., the fact that proper names are taboo and thus part of a cultural code) that will allow him later to theorize a “science of the concrete.” Lévi-Strauss complies with his duty without thinking, apparently, of the consequences of violence—in any of the literal, metaphoric, or allegoric senses noted above. In short, the deontological ethics of duty in fieldwork overrides the consequentialist morals of anthropology.

Deontics or deontological theories of ethics (from the Greek, deon, “duty”) build on notions of duty to develop obligations, imperatives, and sometimes “rights.” Kant’s categorical imperative, derived from synthetic a priori (knowledge that is not true by definition but gained by intuition rather than by the senses), is an example. Further, duties are etymologically duties to the other; nonetheless, as Foucault (1988) has discussed, deontic imperatives are precisely the ethics of governing the self in relation to others (and things). Governmentality is also an ethics of the self (Burchell 1996; Foucault 1991; Gordon 1991; Rose 1996, 1999). Indeed, deontological systems constitute the ethical subject as self, as individual, as human being, through the ethical duties to the other but not in an ethics for the other. In the Western tradition, deontological theories have been posed against consequentialist ethics.

Consequentialist theories propose moral systems based on assessment of consequences that rest on criteria of ultimate or transcendent value—the good of consequences—that vary as to their imminence and absoluteness. Historically, three types of consequential logics have been developed—ethical egoism, ethical altruism, and utilitarianism—which evaluate the “goodness” of actions in relation to the ego, everyone excluding the ego, and everyone including the ego, respectively. Anthropology, with its ethical relation to others (i.e., subjects of research), has implicitly and practically developed a fourth variation, which I am calling a restricted consequentialism because the consequences of actions (especially related
Both deontic ethics and consequentialist theories are strongly normative, but they can also operate within frameworks that prioritize the specificity of situations and context over the flat application of “universal” rules; this is especially developed in the “applied ethics” of specific fields, such as medicine or anthropology. In other words, consequentialist and deontic principles can operate with ethical frameworks that are situational as well as in normative moral frameworks that are universalist. The AAA Code of Ethics, for example, attempts to forge a situationalist and relativist ethics out of both consequentialist and deontic criteria.

The consequentialist logic is clearly evident throughout the AAA Code in statements such as: “Anthropological researchers must do everything in their power to ensure that their research does not harm the safety, dignity, or privacy of the people with whom they work, conduct research, or perform other professional activities” (AAA 1998:III.A.2). The marked language of harm and danger are key words to indicate consequentialism. The language of deontics is, in contrast, unmarked and is more pervasive, which should not be a surprise given that a professional code of ethics is indeed predominantly a moral deontology. Thus, the first paragraph of the introduction of the code establishes that the principle of “generating and appropriately utilizing knowledge (i.e., publishing, teaching, developing programs, and informing policy) of the peoples of the world, past and present, is a worthy goal” and that the “mission of the American Anthropological Association is to advance all aspects of anthropological research and to foster dissemination of anthropological knowledge” (1998: II). The second paragraph establishes that “Anthropologists have a duty to be informed about ethical codes relating to their work and ought periodically to receive training on current research activities and ethical issues” (1998: II).

The logic of duty provides the very structure of the code, which is organized into responsibilities toward specific categories of persons (as discussed below) and appears in the language of “should” (vs. “must” as above): “Anthropological researchers should be alert to the danger of compromising anthropological ethics as a condition to engage in research” (1998: III.paragraph 1). The phrasing in terms of “responsibility” indexes duties and deontology. For example, in the second section under the subheading “Responsibility to scholarship and science,” the code reads:

Anthropological researchers bear responsibility for the integrity and reputation of their discipline, of scholarship, and of science. Thus, anthropological researchers are subject to the general moral rules of scientific and scholarly conduct: they should not deceive or knowingly misrepresent (i.e., fabricate evidence, falsify, plagiarize), or attempt to prevent reporting of misconduct, or obstruct the scientific/scholarly research of others. [AAA 1998:III.B.2.]
The bringing into knowledge of otherness, the comprehension of alterity, and the representation of the other is the originary moral violence that is brought to other cultures by anthropology and the West. This theme of epistemological and moral violence of knowledge, writing, and representation has been much discussed in structuralism, poststructuralism, and deconstruction. The premise that knowing the other is the destruction of otherness is a major theme throughout the ethnographic travelogue of *Tristes Tropiques*. The chapter entitled “The Writing Lesson” (Lévi-Strauss 1992:294–304) was written as an allegory for the violence of writing as a technology of domination. The anthropologist’s confrontation with this issue culminates in the chapter, “Robinson Crusoe,” in which the problem of the absolute alterity of the Other is turned inside out from a matter of ethnographic fieldwork to a problem of anthropology as a Western profession of science. In a passage quoted at length below, Lévi-Strauss begins a reflection on ethics by questioning the conceits of anthropology as a profession. The encounter with the radical Other produces neither a fieldwork engagement nor a rumination on fieldwork but, rather, a critique of the discipline’s construction of the Other as an absolute difference from modernity and the West: “I had been given, at one and the same time, my reward and my punishment. *Was it not my mistake, and the mistake of my profession*, to believe that men are not always men?” (Lévi-Strauss 1992:323, emphasis added).

At the outer limits of Western colonization of the Amazon, Lévi-Strauss organizes a trip to meet the Indians of Pimienta Buena. “There is no more thrilling a prospect for the anthropologist than that of being the first white man to visit a particular native community” (1992:325). Far from being a subjective adventure of tourism, he explains that the value of this trip is the very meaning of modernity, of the modern era, of Europe in its search for self-identity:

I was about to relive the experience of the early travelers and, through it, that crucial moment in modern thought when . . . a human community which believed itself to be complete and in its final form suddenly learned . . . that it was not alone, that it was part of a greater whole, and that, in order to achieve self-knowledge, *it must first of all contemplate its unrecognizable image in this mirror*, of which a fragment, forgotten by the centuries, was now about to cast for me alone, its first and last reflection. [Lévi-Strauss 1992:325–326, emphasis added]

Why unrecognizable? Lévi-Strauss further explains as he contemplates the “unrecognizable” image in the mirror that this image is both the Other and the Self.

I had wanted to reach the extreme limits of the savage . . . . After an enchanting trip up-river I had certainly found my savages. Alas! They were only too savage . . . . There they were, all ready to teach me their customs and beliefs, and I did not know their language. *They were as close to me as a reflection in a mirror,* I could touch them, but I could not understand them. [Lévi-Strauss 1992:325–326, emphasis added]

It is not that the Self is a reflection of the Other, but that the Other is a reflection of the Self—a palpable, sentient being that is posed as an extension of the self as
mirror and as reflection. The image is unrecognizable and unintelligible because this difference or alterity that inhabits the Self is projected out as a reflection in the mirror. This trace of the Other (the appearance of the Other in the mirror) is also the trace of the Self. This difference (trace) and its being beyond comprehension triggers his moral contemplation of the function and practice of anthropology.

I had been given, at one and the same time, my reward and my punishment. Was it not my mistake, and the mistake of my profession, to believe that men are not always men? That some are more deserving of interest and attention because they astonish us by the colour of their skin and their customs? I had only to succeed in guessing what they were like for them to be deprived of their strangeness; in which case, I might just as well have stayed in my village. Or if, as was the case here, they retained their strangeness, I could make no use of it, since I was incapable of even grasping what it consisted of. Between these two extremes, what ambitious instances provide us with the excuses by which we live? Who, in the last resort, is the real dupe of the confusion created in the reader’s mind by observations which are carried just far enough to be intelligible and then are stopped in mid-career, because they cause surprise in human beings similar to those who take such customs as a matter of course? Is it the reader who believes in us, or we ourselves who have no right to be satisfied until we have succeeded in dissipating a residue which serves as a protest for our vanity? [Lévi-Strauss, 1992:323–324, emphasis added]

Unlike the encounter with the girls, he eschews fieldwork and interaction with the “untouched” indigenous group with whom he cannot communicate and cannot know. What is the basis of the difference in comportment in these two ethnographic encounters between the little girls and the unintelligible Indian? Are they not both fieldwork encounters? Or does the difference in narrativization point to a difference of problematizations? Is it not his duty as anthropologist to know, represent, and comprehend the Other and others? We must remember, for Lévi-Strauss, anthropology is not a job; it is a vocation, a calling. What then can we make of the ethics of this calling there in the forest with the little girls in contrast to this contemplation and moral critique of anthropology?

Instead of engaging this Other through fieldwork, he chooses a Marlowesque flight downriver precisely to avoid the consequences of the various forms of violence—literal, metaphoric, symbolic, civilizational, and so forth—that his comprehension of this radical Other would entail.12 “We made the journey downstream with remarkable speed” (Lévi-Strauss 1992:334). The erasure of the actual encounter and interaction in this last instance points again to the disjunctive articulation of the ethical (inclusive sense) in ethnography and anthropology.

Standing alone in that moment of face-to-face proximity, Lévi-Strauss questions the duty of anthropology in terms of consequences. This is a questioning that reveals not a true virtue or absolute good—the pursuit of knowledge—but a vanity in the assumption that there is an essential difference among men (i.e., humans). In the mirror of the Other, he sees the false vanity of anthropological duty. The (scientific) pursuit of knowledge is not an absolute good because it is premised on a mistake. This is the mistake that “some men are not always men.” The anthropological will to know difference is disclosed as the vanity of
self-fashioning ("self-knowledge") that uses the mirror-trace of the Other to reflect "self-knowledge." Consequentialist logic is used to critique the duty of the profession, but is not this critique also a function of Enlightenment thinking—to know oneself? Thus, consequences turn from consideration of the effects on the Other to the meaning for the Self: vanity in self-making. In the first encounter, the Other is effaced by the immediate presence of others, and the duty of ethnography to the production of knowledge proceeds until "there is no more information forthcoming." Instead of acting in the solitary complicity of fieldwork with the vast corrupting forces of civilizational progress that are represented in his profession, the anthropologist here chooses to disengage. Far from the heart of this darkness, he narrativizes his encounter to tell us not about ethics in fieldwork but the morals of anthropology. The ethnographic moment with the Other comes to inhabit the morals of anthropology as an ethical problem of consequences.

What happens to this consequentialist morals of the profession in the aftermath of the critique of the Other as a literary science fiction of ethnographic writing? To address this question, we need first discuss the thematization of morals in the historiography of anthropology and a recent analysis of ethics that charts four moments of ethical thinking in anthropology.

**Thematization of Morals in Anthropology**

Once one treats the history of anthropology . . . [by] taking account of the practical relationships between observers and observed, and their subsequent transformation by the representations of ethnography, this history multiplies into colonial situations, intellectual genealogies, and practical anthropologies. [Pels and Salemink 2000:4].

Sociopolitical histories (in contrast to intellectual histories) of anthropology often focus on how “anthropology” has been implicated in colonial, neocolonial, postcolonial, and nation-building projects. My aim is not to assess this historiography but to comment on the epistemological issue of how the past is differentiated from the present and on how this can carry a moral value. This moral value can be especially charged in histories of anthropology that consider the power dynamics or practical effects of anthropological practice.

Michel de Certeau (1988) identifies the “historiographic operation” as a rhetorical, discursive, textual, and epistemological cutting that not simply separates out the past from the present but actively constitutes and produces the “past” as object for analysis. This making of the past is the necessary condition for historical analysis not only to have an object but also to effect a recuperation of the past in the present (e.g., as its other or as its identity) or a suturing of the present to the past (e.g., as its continuation, culmination, or extension). The past is therefore othere—made other and presented as other—in ways that correspond to the theory and agenda of historical analysis. The making of the “past” as other is a means to imbue the past, explicitly or implicitly, with moral value. Johannes Fabian (1983) analyzed this process in ethnography as allochronism, whereby the physical presence of subjects of research in fieldwork are textually and discursively made
into an Other corresponding to a past era of cultural or civilizational development. Lévi-Strauss’s narrativization of his ethnographic encounters with Amazonian indigenous peoples illustrates this epistemological othering that is concomitantly a moral othering.

If we consider the arguments of Peter Pels and Oscar Salemink (2000) on the practical history of anthropology, it could be argued that Lévi-Strauss’s transformations of other persons into an Other that represents a morally pristine and authentic precivilizational past is based on the erasure of anthropology’s own past and the practical involvement of this past in the lifeworlds of his subjects. Pels and Salemink (2000) argue that writing the history of anthropology entails a moral, disciplinary, and political distanciation, if not at times a complete dissociation from prior generations and their anthropologies. Specifically, they argue that those forms of anthropology and practitioners of anthropological activities that were associated with colonial rule, policy, advocacy, and governing are written out of histories as true or legitimate anthropologies. This is arguably evident in the case of Lévi-Strauss: although he persistently notes the contributions of the voyagers of discovery (e.g., Thevet, Lery, and Staden) and intellectual progenitors (e.g., Rousseau) to the formation of anthropology (1992:326), there is a dissociation in his narrative from those anthropological practices articulated to colonial governing.

Pels and Salemink distinguish three generations of anthropologies—a colonial anthropology (19th to early 20th century), a professionalizing generation (1925–60), and a politicized or radical generation (roughly dating late 1960s or early 1970s to 1980s). The latter two construct the past of anthropology in a narrative of disjuncture so as to contain the moral impropriety, disciplinary deficiencies, and “political incorrectness” that might be derived from the prior generation’s relationship to colonialism. The writing of the history of anthropology by the professionalizing generation, to which Lévi-Strauss belongs, completely disqualifies the anthropologies developed in service of colonialism as “anthropology.” The professionalizing generation defined anthropology as a “science” that could only serve “truth” if located in institutions (the university, not government) and supported by sponsors (philanthropies, not administrative agencies) that could provide the necessary “objectivity” and “neutrality” from which truth could be disclosed and accumulated for the sake of progress and modernity. This epistemological making of the past of anthropology (as practically nonexistent) is the foundation on which the antihero of Tristes Tropiques can imagine a world untouched by anthropology. He thereby has recourse to search only for intellectuals such as Rousseau as ancestors. Meanwhile, anthropology’s past as written by the politicized, radical generation of the 1970s–80s viewed the professionalizing generation as morally corrupt for its bad faith and its complicity in various neocolonial, nationalist, and espionage projects as a “hypocritically value-free science” (Pels and Salemink 2000:6).

Pels and Salemink make clear that the moralization of the past of anthropology serves political agendas regarding institutional resources, career statuses, and disciplinary power within public spheres. The moralization is also the means to its own end: the moralized past works as a mirror that can reflect an image of one’s
generational practice of anthropology as a morally good and correct anthropology. My interest in their analysis is that it illustrates the conflation of a historical, cultural, or political analysis with the analysis of ethics and morals. It is true that politics entail ethics and morals and that both ethics and morals are political or have political foundations and effects. However, the analysis of ethics (or morals) is not the same thing as a cultural analysis of politics, or a political analysis of culture (i.e., cultural practices), or a historical analysis of cultural politics. When an analysis of the politics of the history of anthropology appears to connote moral implications, a consequentialist morals is likely to be operating as a subtext; the analysis of political action that focuses on decision making, effects of actions, causes of events, and so forth, can easily be imbued with a moral meaning and value. Thus, when the historical study of the field of anthropology turns from intellectual history, or the history of ideas as such, to “social or political histories” or “histories of the cultural politics and practices” of anthropology, then this history is easily “moralized.” Analyses become pervaded by moral judgments (whether implicit or explicit) derived from principles such as consequentialism, which are not usually manifested; further, there is also often a lack of description of the specific ethics and morals of social actors and how these became manifested, contradicted, conflicted, or discarded in historical action, decision-making, and social contexts.

I refer to this moral judgment made with neither argument nor analysis as moralism; it can be recognized in various fields, such as postcolonial or cultural studies, in which the cultural analysis of power, political effects, meanings, relationships, and dynamics of action and discourse can be invested with a hidden consequentialist morality. Politics and the analysis of cultural politics are in one way or another about “consequences”; thus, there is always, at least, an implicit moral position based on consequentialist logics in the text of analysis per se or in the reading of such analyses. Thus, moralism is based on the projection of a morality onto actors who may hold other ethics and moralities than those that are projected onto them.

On the one hand, to levy moral critique without analyzing the ethics involved clearly serves only to antagonize anthropologists or other colleagues and disciples who become implicated in moral wrongdoing. It effects a polarization of the profession in which the stakes are less intellectual than the symbolic capital and statuses of academic careers and markets. Without actual analysis of the morals and ethics of prior anthropologies, moralism (moral judgment without analysis of ethics) becomes reduced to the assertion that the choices or politics specific to them are immoral. On the other hand, this conflation enables political acts and the analyses of politics to pass as normative moral judgment (or action) precisely when the situational ethics of choice and action are contested and should, therefore, be rigorously inspected. Analysis becomes conflated with and pervaded by moralism that transforms both analysis and morals into political action. In such cases, “The use of ethics . . . with its impossible conceit of impartiality, only masks politics” (Pels 1999:103).13
The implication is that the historiography of anthropology—as well as other forms of cultural analysis concerned with power and political dynamics and effects—might be better off to guard against such conflation and substitution. This would entail care in one’s analysis so as to avoid imbuing cultural analysis with moral critique that is not expressly manifested as to the ethical positioning and principles of the author and, especially, of the actors and situations that are analyzed. On the flip side, this argument suggests the real need and opportunity to develop explicitly ethical analyses and sustained moral inquiry in the history of anthropology’s practices, politics, practitioners, and institutions. The reading offered here of ethics in Lévi-Strauss is an example.

How do Pels and Salemink avoid the same moralism in their revisionist history? In a related text, Pels (1997) argues that the “anthropology of its past” is substantively convergent with the “anthropology of colonialism” and, furthermore, that this field of inquiry is or amounts to a “historiography of the present,” which, we can note, is specifically infused with a Foucauldian notion of genealogy. Thus, whereas they identify the moralism and politics of the making of the past, they themselves look for the threads that “re-suture” the historiographic fissure in ways that try to avoid moralism and politicization. Arguing against the critique of their work as presentist and historicist, they invoke the need to scrutinize the very terms of history. Substantively, this historiography is a genealogy of practices that seeks to chart the fundamental governmentality of various practical anthropologies entangled with colonial projects and contexts. Anthropology as ethnographic activity becomes the common conceptual denominator that, on the one hand, articulates anthropological practices to structures and agencies of power as a colonial art of governmentality and, on the other hand, allows for these practical anthropologies of colonialism to be brought into comparative relations with professional anthropological practices. Contemporary disciplinary practices (“activities”) may not be identical, but they also operate in homologous and parallel ways in the world to effect practical modes of intervention and governmentality.

In an argument closely linked to the historiographic arguments that he and Salemink developed, Pels (1999) distinguishes four periods of distinct ethical thinking in anthropology. These four ethical periods roughly correspond to the three generations of anthropologies already discussed with the addition of a fourth that roughly correlates to the 1980s–90s. In tracking these four moments, Pels argues for the emergence of an inherent “duplexity” or a dual responsibility on the part of the anthropologist to both sponsors and subjects. I seek to enlarge and complicate his reading of ethics with the elements that have been identified in my discussion of Lévi-Strauss.

**Double Articulation: Morals and Ethics, Anthropology and Ethnography**

Duplexity, as conceived by Pels (1999) is both an “epistemological doubling” and a “double standard” or “dual mandate.” The first refers to the problematic and
supplementary relationship between politics and ethics: ethics seeks to be outside politics but any specific ethics is dependent on the hidden politics that substantiates its conventions; at the same time, politics always uses ethics as its legitimation and its mask. This relationship between politics and ethics is “triangulated” according to Pels with truth, specifically the scientific vision and goal of truth, which he claims “has its own morals” and also sets itself against or outside politics. Although in agreement that science has its own morals, I argue that it is important to distinguish the different moral logics, focalizations, and external criteria of value that provide scientific morality with its specific content and expression, especially to track changes in scientific moralities over time, as is Pels’s objective. The “double mandate” that he identifies, or what I prefer to identify as a dual focalization of morals, is the contemporary coexistence of different ethical relationships to, on the one hand, the sponsors and funders of research and, on the other hand, the subjects of research that are studied and represented. By focalization I mean the “to whom” and “for whom” an ethical relationship is established. Pels’s argument is largely an explanation of the emergence of the morality of representation (or ethical relationship to the represented) within an anthropology that initially formulated its informal morals in relation to (colonial) sponsors of research.

Pels establishes that preprofessional anthropologies were embedded within colonial projects and assumed direct or indirect roles in governing and administration, policy and advocacy. This institutional setting constituted the primary moral relationship to the colonial sponsors of research in which anthropology as science would be responsible for producing knowledge and truth formalized toward the broader universalizing goal of the civilizing mission. What is left out of Pels’s discussion, however, is an explicit consideration of the formal content and expression of this relationship as a deontological morality. Although he clarifies that truth, scientific truth, is positioned as the absolute—external or transcendent—criteria of value that governs the morals (i.e., the value to which moral action appeals), his illustrations demonstrate that this morality is deontological. Furthermore, this duty has a split focalization that was hierarchized, first to science and second to sponsors—as “service” (Pels 1999:102). The duty to sponsors however was often in the name of the native: their welfare and their adaptive conversion to civilization (civilizing mission). Recognizing this split duty within scientific morality clarifies the condition of possibility of the use of duplicitous identities by colonial anthropologists that Pels is concerned to explain as another level of “epistemological doubling of identity” (1999:106–109).

Professionalization was specifically an institutional relocation of anthropologists from governmental institutions to the institutional context of the university and philanthropic sponsorship (Stocking 1992; Nugent 2002). Although the overarching morality of science prevailed, albeit modified, this change also initiated the substitution of the deontological relation to sponsors with an ethical relationship to the subjects of research, initially, as clients and later as the “studied” or “represented.” This shift in morals, which provoked the codification of a professional ethics (Pels 1999:110), is, of course, part of the political struggle of one group to
restrict its members and to establish their expertise through the delegitimization of competing experts situated in different institutional locations (Pels 1999:103).

Pels argues that professionalization provided the condition of possibility for the disciplinary split of applied and pure or basic research. Both retained a scientific morality of value-free science, neutrality, and objectivity that positioned (scientific) truth as the absolute criteria of value. Whereas practical anthropologies of colonialism maintained a scientific morality that held the civilizing mission as the transcendent criteria of value (supported by scientific “truth”), academic anthropologies “depoliticized” science as part of the disciplinary politics of legitimation. This “depoliticization” is evident, for example, in Boas’s coupling of scientific activism through the study of race and migration with unequivocal disavowal of espionage by anthropologists (cf. Pels 1999:110–111). A depoliticized, “value-free” science is premised on the dissociation of knowledge production from the politics of the nation (international and internal politics) but not of the “social” problems of civil society. Thus, applied anthropology sought to address the same domain of issues with which colonial anthropologies were concerned, but these were now comprehended as “social problems” with a new focalization of ethics—within a deontological morality an ethical relation was established with the subjects of research as clients.

The scientific morals of pure research were also adapted to circumstances: The substance and form (as opposed to the content and expression) of the transcendent criteria of scientific truth was supplanted by the truth of the Other and of others as the means to critique colonial policy (in the case of British anthropology) or Western modernity (in Anglo–North American anthropology). Scientific truth remained the expression of the absolute criteria of value to which professional anthropologists had a deontic morality, but the substance was being displaced by the formal truths—the facts—of other cultures as represented in ethnography (Pels 1999:108–110). This change in the criteria of value might be characterized as a shift from scientific truth to “anthropological ‘truth’ that harboured both a critique of Western values and a tacit compliance with them” (Pels 1999:109). Thus, the focalization on sponsors in a deontic relation was minimized in the shift from government to university and philanthropic anthropologies (in large part because of the shared ideology of science); instead, the subjects of research became positioned in ethics as both moral principles of value in themselves and as social agents to whom anthropology has an ethical relation in ethnography. In other words, there is the emergence of a moral framework built on the relationship to both others (real, historical subjects of ethnography) based in a deontic logic and to the Other within an increasingly incoherent scientific morality of duty. Again the difference between ethics and morals in ethnography and in anthropology appears significant.

It can be quickly noted that there is an ethical contradiction or aporia between the formulation in applied anthropology of a consequentialist and a duty-based ethics in relation to others as clients. The contradiction, inherited from a distinction in Western philosophy between the moral logic of consequentialism and of the nonconsequentialist deontics, is best illustrated in the reference made
by Pels (1999:105) to Kirsten Hastrup and Peter Elsass who had argued that “advocacy is incompatible with anthropology in that it implies stepping out of the anthropological profession into an ‘essentially moral’ discourse involving choices of interest that cannot be ethnographically legitimated” (Pels 1999:105). In one of the few places where he elaborates the logic of the morals and ethics under question, Pels explains that “anthropology is concerned with ‘contexts’ rather than ‘interests’; the [scientific] duty to present the entire context prevents any rational identification [which would be based in consequentialist morality] with the interests of a selected group” (Pels 1999:105, emphasis added). In subsequent generations, this contradiction between the logics of consequences and of duty is pragmatically resolved through the differentiation—and prioritization—of a situational ethics of fieldwork based in consequences against the ethics of ethnography and the morals of anthropology.

In this context we can reconsider Tristes Tropiques. This text, written in 1955 about travel experiences in 1938–39, falls nicely within the periodization of the professionalizing generation. It illustrates aspects of the historical shift from a scientific deontics to consequentialist morals as a tension (which our reading has drawn out) between the deontological ethics of ethnography and the consequentialist morality of anthropology. The first of these privileges the scientific duty of knowledge production about others over consideration of the consequences resulting from the study of others whereas the second prioritizes the consequences of the study of the Other over the deontological imperatives of science. Indeed, Lévi-Strauss’s commentary on the encounter with anthropology’s imagined absolute Other is a consequentialist critique of the false morals of scientific duty specifically formulated as a critique of professional duty. Significantly, this anticipates the later critique that the deontic morals (in ethnography) of the second generation were hypocritical.

Further, the third generation takes up this anthropological morality to the Other that was illustrated by the allegory of Lévi-Strauss on his canoe trip. The prioritization of the Other as the moral criteria of value in anthropology as a profession is consolidated in relation to the various scandals of espionage in U.S. anthropology (see Fleuhr-Lobban 2003a; Pels 1999). The ethical relation of anthropologists to the subjects of research is finally consolidated as the primary professional duty (however, with a restricted consequentialist logic) over and against duties to science but in a tension with duty to sponsors, funders, and clients. Thus, in Pels’s periodization, this third ethics is characterized by this duplexity or double focalization. He notes that the resurgence of the ethical relation to sponsors, funders, and clients is triggered by a reduction of academic employment as well as a problematization of the moral goodness of the studied caused by “studying up” the hierarchy of social power versus “studying down.”

More significant to my mind, however, are the broader contexts of decolonization and the emergence of transnational NGOs dedicated to researching and managing other cultures in ways that replace colonial forms of governmentality
with neocolonial forms of flexible governmentality. This economic sector of globalization absorbs the excess unemployed from academia and establishes expertise over the traditional and, in some case, not so traditional subjects of anthropological research. This creates a competition between NGO- and commerce-based anthropologies, on the one hand, and university and philanthropic anthropologies, on the other hand, in terms of expert knowledge, worldly relevance, financial resources, career status, and symbolic capital.

**Triple Focus: Duty to Publics, Audiences, Consumers**

In his conclusion, Pels argues that codes as prescriptive devices are inadequate—even utopic—but that the codes may serve pedagogical purposes of training new generations to think about and resolve ethical debates. Pels implies but does not identify that a third focalization of ethics has emerged, which is precisely the audiences, publics, and consumers of anthropology. Recognizing that ethics involves relations to agents other than just sponsors and subjects, the revised 1998 AAA Code of Ethics establishes deontic responsibilities and obligations not only to those with whom or for whom research is conducted but also to (1) scholarship and science, (2) the public, and (3) students and trainees. This points out that there may be more than two sides in ethical duplexity. I suggest a triple focus by adding a general category of publics.

Although it may be true that anthropology has always been concerned with its publics and with the dissemination of its findings, however, I suggest that this concern has not been in terms of an ethics or even a normative morals in which there is a relation of ethical responsibility or obligation to its public. The concern to disseminate knowledge is an ethical imperative defined not primarily as a relation to a public but as fundamental part of the duties of science and the scientist. In contrast to sociocultural anthropologies, archaeology has initiated a different approach to its publics. By conceiving and interacting with its publics as stakeholders, descendent communities, and cultural owners, archaeology transforms the function of dissemination from the obligation of science to communicate findings into an essentially and primarily ethical relationship of engagement not with science but with publics.19 This “lead” that archaeology has taken in developing publics as a third focalization of ethics is directly related to the moral and, less often, political power that some indigenous groups have in laying claims over archaeological materials as their cultural property. This in itself is a difficult area of ethics, but complications are also added because this is an inclusive category that includes not only somewhat specific and discrete groups of interlocutors, such as stakeholders and descendent communities, but nebulous, dispersed, or nonorganized collectivities, such as tourists of cultural heritage, students, colleagues, and communities of lay readers, television and documentary viewers, and other consumers of anthropological knowledge available in mass media.
The ethical issues are therefore slippery because, at times, publics, audiences, and consumers can be treated and addressed in a default manner as though the ethical relationship was the same as that which obtains to sponsors and, at other times, the same as that which obtains to the subjects of research. However, the issues are also slippery because this focalization immediately invokes the ethical problems of interpretation and dissemination, each of which is distinct and significantly different than the question of representation, especially in regard to the moralization of representation evident in post-1980s critiques. Further, it seems evident that the ethical relation to publics is fundamentally inhabited by a deontic thinking of duties defined in relation, as noted above, to scholarship and students, but not consumers and other audiences that are not colleagues, students, funders, nor subjects of research (see the AAA Code of Ethics). The question of the moralization of ethnographic representation, which is conflicted by an overt consequentialist ethics, is squeezed out of view by the attention created by these ethical foci. It is to this latter issue that I now turn.

Ethnography as “Moral Science”: Morals of Representation, Ethics of Fieldwork

Pels identifies a moralization of representation beginning with the third generation of anthropology. He characterizes this as the use of the truth of the Other or others as the launching point for the project of cultural critique that inhabits the anthropological endeavor. The professionalizing generation used the representation of different cultural truths against the hegemonic truths of science and Western common sense. In this regard, ethnography became a kind of “moral science”—to make a pun on the concept of 19th-century German social science grounded in historical particularism. The fourth generation inherited this project of culture critique and the trend in the moralization of ethnography but with a significant difference. The question of morality shifted from the moral use and implications of ethnography (i.e., ethnographic truths of others) to a question of the ethical propriety of ethnography as a representation of the Other and others.

This shift is triggered by the well-known critiques of the 1980s that dismantled not only the fiction of “culture” as a preexistent reality external to the ethnographic text but also the trope of the Other along with essentialist otherness. The ethnographies emergent from the 1980s embraced these critiques and problematized the politics and ethics of representation initially and then of fieldwork itself. To my mind, it is crucial that these two registers of ethical problems or substantive issues remain conceptually and analytically distinct. If we avoid their conflation, it can help to identify the different logics or reasoning, focalizations, values, and types of application that operate in each register of ethical issues. Thus, what is not identified, by Pels for example, is that the writing “against culture” in various theoretical traditions since the 1980s entailed additional changes in ethics. By way
of conclusion, I offer a brief characterization of these changes as a provocation for
debate and discussion and, specifically, as hypotheses for further ethical analysis.

Ethnographers have increasingly eschewed synthesizing portrayals of culture
in favor of a sustained questioning of the ethical and moral basis of ethnographic
practice. Thus, as with Lévi-Strauss’s story of the little girls, we have increasingly
revealed in writing those incidents, dynamics, events, and processes in which the
ethics of our own activities in fieldwork can be interrogated. Although there is
anguish and reflexivity over ethics, however these are now directed by different cri-
teria than those troubling Lévi-Strauss:21 In place of the external values of science
(the vocation of anthropology) and the Other, alterity (difference) without the Other
but in the name of others becomes a dominant criteria of value—the external “good”
around which ethics revolves. In the register of anthropology, Lévi-Strauss’s conse-
quentialism (normative morals)—oriented to the Other—is displaced by a context-
driven, situationalist, and deontological ethics oriented to alterity and the rights
of others. This is a relativist ethics that holds morals to be normative conventions
of communities and articulates to a restricted consequentialism that evaluates the
consequences of actions in terms of effects on a specific group.

In the fourth moment of ethics, the primary ethical relation to the subjects
of research articulates a split in the ethics of ethnography. Whereas the ethics in
the realm of ethnography (communication of knowledge production) focuses on
the subjects of research as “represented,” ethics in the realm of ethnographic field-
work focuses on subjects as “studied” others. As an example consider Ruth Behar’s
Translated Woman (1993), an ethnography that sustains interrogation of the ethical,
moral, and political meanings both of fieldwork engagements “there” and of the
written representations derived from ethnography “here.” In contrast to the vision
of morals in ethnography identified in Lévi-Strauss, which is strongly normative
and universalist, both the ethics of fieldwork and of representation are funda-
mentally situationalist. Ultimately, the situational ethics of fieldwork will remain
context driven and context specific—that is, it has its primary meaning and value
in the lived contexts of fieldwork engagement. In contrast, the situational ethics
of representation, however much a sustained interrogation of the ethical engage-
ments of fieldwork, open toward a normative moral position that is transcendent
of context regarding the consequences and relevance of representation for cultural
others in general. By this I mean simply that the contemporary moral problemati-
ization of representation is characterized by universalist application, transcendence
of context, and normative deontics. In this sense, ethnographic representation is
a moral problem in opposition to ethnographic fieldwork, which is increasingly
construed as problem and matter of situational ethics within a relativist frame in
which one or more forms of consequentialism holds sway.

This distinction of normative morals and situationalist ethics is important
for how it clarifies Pels’s concluding argument. He argues that ethical codes are
utopic—that is, quite beside the point of the actual on-the-ground ways and criteria
of dealing with ethical issues and making ethical choices by anthropologists. He
finds value in the codes as pedagogical tools for debate. The confusion that I see here is that codes and codification are normative, prescriptive, universalist, and transcendent principles. They are normative morals but what actually operates in the great diversity of anthropological research practices is primarily a situational ethics. Thus, the disjunction is not simply one of codes and practice but of morals and ethics. The AAA Code of Ethics, however, is a code that stridently works away from normative moral positioning and moves toward a fundamentally situational and relativist ethics.

Codes in Context: Moral Relativism and Situational Ethics

The AAA Code of Ethics begins with a preamble that locates the anthropologist as an ethical subject formed at the intersection of a multiplicity of ethical and moral systems, codes, imperatives, duties, and values that derive from identities and memberships in a plurality of incommensurable groups (family, religion, profession, community, etc.). The code thereby establishes moral relativism (a position that holds morals are conventions created by, rooted in, and applicable to a given community) as the groundwork of ethics or ethical action:

In a field of such complex involvements and obligations, it is inevitable that misunderstandings, conflicts, and the need to make choices among apparently incompatible values will arise. Anthropologists are responsible for grappling with such difficulties and struggling to resolve them in ways compatible with the principles stated here. [AAA 1998; emphasis added]

First, let us consider the principles and, second, the “grappling.” The code goes on to define primarily deontological obligations of responsibility to subjects of research, science and scholarship, publics, students and trainees. This codified deontic ethics is tempered in practice by consequentialism, primarily that type that I have here called “restricted.” A motivating assumption of this article is that to successfully grapple with the multiplicity of our own ethics, we need to have both greater understanding of how ethics works and a conceptual language to define the elements that are involved. We need more tools with which to grapple with our responsibility. To assess the significance and value of different types of ethical imperatives, obligations, normative rules, duties, and responsibilities and how they weigh in on any given action or decision, it seems useful to add conceptual tools that allow us to analyze more explicitly and understand different criteria, principles, and values, and to articulate how they are relevant, applied, and conflicted. The elements introduced in this article—distinctions between ethics and morals, specification of moral logics, differentiation of spheres of ethical questioning, identification of different criteria of values, and focalization of ethical relations—are tools that can be added to the toolbox to help us grapple with the difficulties of ethics.

A visual map of this “forest of ethics” is drawn out of the analysis above (see Table 1). As summary and synthesis it relies on reduction and simplification. This device, including its flaws, is offered as a tool by which to find paths in and
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<td>Anthropology (contemporary, fourth moment)</td>
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through ethics—that is, to provoke discussion, debate, and more explicit ethical analyses of ethics in anthropology.

Notes

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1. The quote is from the chapter entitled, “On the Line,” which refers to the telegraph lines that the government established in the territory. He reads the telegraph, often out of service, not as a straight metaphor of progress but as a symbol of the decadence and failures of modernity.

2. I want to underscore that the event is initiated with Lévi-Strauss listening to the other because listening (or hearing the call of the other) and the proximity necessary to listen are fundamental to the ethics of Levinas. The significance is that although there is a shared condition of possibility and semblance of acts, ultimately, these two modes of ethics diverge.

3. The “Family Life” chapter on the Nambikwara (pp. 281–293) concludes with a description, made by an anthropologist ten years later, of the physical and cultural devastation suffered in relation to U.S. protestant missionaries. Lévi-Strauss prefers “to forget this harrowing description and retain only the memory of an experience recorded one night in my notebook” (1992:293).

4. Trouillot (2003) treats this same problematic with his notion of the savage slot. The language used here (trace, image, mirror, Other) keys my analysis not only to Lévi-Strauss’s text but also to the work on ethics of Emmanuel Levinas (1987) and Jacques Derrida (1978).

5. The notion of double articulation is borrowed and adapted from Deleuze and Guattari (1987). My use of this notion does not claim any mimetic fidelity. In other words, I “make do” with it (de Certeau 1984).

6. I specifically point to this as a trace to indicate not only the articulation of the questions of presence, writing, and ethics but also the thinking through of these issues by Derrida (1978), Lévi-Strauss (1992), and Levinas (1987). See also Bernasconi 1988.

7. This contrast is crucial for the ethics developed by Emmanuel Levinas that is conceived as “for the other”; the alterity of the other is prioritized over the self, that is, the individual, subject-being, dasein (Baumann 1993; Critchley 1992; Derrida 1978; Levinas 1987, 1998).

8. For example, Kant’s categorical imperative is developed in opposition to consequential utilitarianism.


10. Exemplifying these same debates within anthropology is the debate between Dennis Tedlock and Steve Tyler on dialogue as either the moral solution to the crisis of representation or as the quintessential violence of representation (Tedlock and Tyler 1987).

11. I have used this allegory to analyze my own fieldwork (Castañeda 1996:232–258).
12. In Joseph Conrad’s novel, *Heart of Darkness* (1990), the story develops as the slow, long, and arduous journey of the main character, Marlow, into the Congo to find the legendary Kurtz, a colonial administrator, whose character is imbued with the transcendent value. The novel dramatically changes pace and tone when Marlow meets Kurtz, who in the face-to-face is quite antithetical to Marlow’s estimation. Marlow recoils and races back downstream to London as the novel closes with an ironic and trenchant critique of Western values and imperialist civilization. As noted by a number of commentators, Lévi-Strauss reproduces this narrative effect and tempo in his encounter with the utterly Other that is textually staged in the place of Kurtz. For anthropology, South America has always been the other “Heart of Darkness” with Africa.


14. The Foucauldian basis of their historical vision however does not prevent them from advocating the need for multiple histories to do justice to the multiplicities of anthropologies. Pels and Salemink avoid moralizing the past and prior generations of anthropologies by recuperating colonial anthropologies to a broader conception of anthropology and by interrogating how these anthropologies have come to shape aspects of our contemporary reality.

15. Elsewhere, I have offered the concept of “disciplinary modality” as a means to think through contrastive similarities of different anthropologies, specifically how they are formed at the point in which distinct research agendas, methodologies, and theoretical practices are articulated (enabled or constrained) to specific institutions, funding, forms of governmentality, and political positioning in the public sphere (Castañeda 1996:232–258). See Nugent 2002 on institutional funding bases of anthropology and its effects on agendas and forms of research.

16. Pels does not periodize these four ethical moments with dates; these are my correlations.

17. The precise meaning of “epistemological doubling” remains unclear to me: Why is the “ethical” defined as *epistemological*? Why is the “doubling” defined as a *triangulation*? The only way I can make sense of this figure is to imagine that epistemology (or “truth”) is the midpoint on a folded line on which the two endpoints, defined as ethics and politics, are brought into proximity or contact. Yet this appears to reduce either to an open-jaw triangle or a double line.


19. Archaeology has developed new ethical relations toward the publics, stakeholders, and descendent communities it serves and with which it interacts as it moves away from defining its ethics in terms of a strict scientific duty to the archaeological record (see Zimmerman et al. 2003, especially parts 2 and 3; see also Castañeda n.d.).


21. It would be unjust and erroneous to say that Lévi-Strauss was not “reflexive.” The content and expression, objects and direction, of the reflexivity of his thought is simply not commensurable with contemporary conventions and normative criteria that designate what qualifies as “reflexivity.”

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In arguing for a differentiation of ethics from morals as well as between ethics and morals in the domains of ethnography and anthropology, an analysis of ethical issues described by Levi-Strauss in *Tristes Tropiques* (1992) enables a critical commentary on, first, the thematization of ethics in the historiography of anthropology and, second, a recent analysis by Peter Pels of the double focus, or dual orientation, of ethics in relation to both sponsors and subjects of study. This metaethical analysis tracks differences in the reasoning, values, problematizations, and focus of ethics and morals in the distinct domains of ethnographic fieldwork, ethnographic representation, the general field of anthropology, and the historiography of anthropology.