The Maya Identity of Yucatan, 1500–1935: Re-Thinking Ethnicity, History and Anthropology

Quetzil E. Castañeda and Ben Fallaw, guest editors
“We Are Not Indigenous!”
An Introduction to the Maya Identity of Yucatan

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At Chichén Itzá during the spring equinox of 1995 I noticed an Anglo-North American man shaking hands with and bowing to three Lamas at the north side of the base of the Pyramid of Kukulcan (Himpele and Castañeda 1997; see also Bryant 1996). The man and the Lamas, as well as a council of rural Maya teachers and campesinos, were participating in a spiritual pilgrimage directed by Hunbatz Men, a new age Mayan Elder or shaman-guru (see Hunbatz Men 1990; Castañeda 1996: 175–200). I asked the man if he knew who were those Yucatec Maya persons standing beside the spiritual leaders and why he did not shake their hands. He explained that a cosmic “change” was coming to better the world and that this change, “who knows,” may result in the eventual “freedom” of the Maya from “slavery” and “oppression.” He punctuated his remarks by asserting, “You know there are a lot of hassles in Chiapas” (quote from Himpele and Castañeda 1997).

Indeed, there are “hassles” in Chiapas. If we can, for a moment, sidestep this inflammatory word to describe the politics to which he refers, we might ask about the disconnect in the man’s knowledge about “the Maya.” On the one hand, he has an image of the Maya as victims in a struggle against centuries of injustices. On the other hand, the Yucatec campesinos and school teachers, modestly dressed in West-
ern clothing, who stood a few feet away, were erased from his understanding of the “hassles” and need for solidarity. How is this possible?

In the contexts of globalization, new social movements, Neo-Liberalism, hybridization, postmodernization, post-colonialism, and Latin American peripheral modernities, the consolidation of a Pan-Maya movement in Guatemala and the explosive appearance of the Zapatista Movement in Chiapas offer indigenous alternatives to the binary politics of left and right. Having attracted significant media, political, and scholarly attention from regional, national, and international communities, these Maya alternatives provide powerful examples of a new kind of cultural politics. On this transnational staging, “the Maya” are celebrated as an indigenous people demanding the respect of their cultural, political, and universal human rights. Many, like the Anglo-North American pilgrim in search of spiritual growth among archaeological ruins, are quick to pledge and assert solidarity with “the Maya” all the while ignoring the fact that not all Maya are “the Maya” that they imagine. In this situation, it seems most appropriate, as is the task of this special issue, to ask about those Maya who remain off this globalized stage of media, academic, political, and NGO attention. The articles collected here ask about the ways that anthropology and history have imagined “the Maya” and about those who have been identified as such but have nonetheless remained outside of this imaginary.

Too often the public eyes of the international media and academic community assimilate all Maya to a homogenizing category of a uniform identity. Many have noted the way archaeological and touristic discourses construct an image of the Maya as mysterious and living outside of time. Similarly, the discourses that celebrate the Maya as a culture and people surviving oppression, modernity, and capitalism through struggles against the national (and racialist) elite, create a monolithic stereotype that erases the heterogeneity and cultural diversity of the Maya.

This homogenization was evident, for example, in some of the responses to a 1999 exhibition of contemporary Yucatec Maya art in the USA. This artwork is based on ancient Maya aesthetics and sold in the tourist markets of Chichén Itzá, Merida and the Mexican Caribbean. In an open forum discussion the opinion was expressed that the choice of a predominantly aesthetic, rather than ethnographic, display constituted an inappropriate depoliticization and even distortion of Maya peoples. This position views the curation of objects stigmatized as tourist art as lacking a contextualization in terms of ongoing and overt political struggles of the Maya—from the Mayan Zapatistas and Pan-Mayanists of Guatemala to Maya identity politics of Yucatan. In other words, the specificity of the local community, was simply deemed insufficient in itself unless it communicated something about the “larger,” “more” important issues of “Maya” “struggles.” At work was an assumption of an essential unity of ethnic, cultural, and social identity between all Maya as construed by “Western imagination.”
In these contexts of erasing the cultural heterogeneity, historical diversity, and local specificities of those who are called “Maya,” this special issue offers an interrogation of the presupposed unity, identity, and ethnicity of the Maya of Yucatan in the period from 1500 to 1935. The analyses presented here reconsider not only the processes of identity formation among those externally identified as Maya in Yucatan but also the very terms of “Maya” identity.

**Are all Maya Maya?**

In the broader scope of the fields of Maya studies the analyses and commentaries included in this theme issue contribute a perspective on an often-voiced question that circulated in private discussions and meetings among some anthropologists in the 1990s. The question is based on the scholarly and transnational media importance given to the Maya of Chiapas and Guatemala because of the sociocultural movements that offer “indigenous” visions of the modern “nation.” Unlike those “Maya,” the “Maya” peoples of Yucatan—not to mention those of Belize—did not initiate any grand media-provoking cultural revitalization and resurgence nor indigenous or subaltern visions of nation and modernity. Why not? Why didn’t the Maya of Yucatan have a globally transnational, media-attended identity politics movement on a par with those of their brethren?

In part the answer is simple and easily available to all students of the Maya. The peoples of Yucatan have a dramatically different history of conquest, colonization, independence and incorporation into a larger nation-state. In other words, these are peoples with a different relationship to the world than those “Maya” of Chiapas, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, San Francisco, Indian Town (Florida), Chicago, and Vancouver.

Relevant here is a comment made by a friend from the town of Pisté who self-identifies as Maya, yet who protested to me: “We are not indigenous!” This dis-identification—of individual and collective scope—was insisted upon in the context of a discussion about the Zapatistas and their march on México City in 2001. While for some this might be easily dismissed as a false consciousness, there are in fact many in Yucatan who reject the politics of the Zapatistas and refuse to be slotted into the “savage-slot” of the rebellious Indio.4 In this “other México” of Yucatan the people not only have another politics, but another modality of identity.

If we allow those who are marked as “Maya” less allochronic otherness and more similarity to “us,” we might make a useful comparison. The claim, by “a Maya” that he is not “indigenous” has a parallel in the way a Texan might absolutely reject the identity of being Chicano/a and at the same time assert that they are indeed Mexican American—which also means neither (hyphenated) Mexican-American nor...
Mexican. In Arizona and New México, a person an outsider might mistake as a Mexican-American, might quite emphatically inform you that they are neither Mexican-American nor Mexican, and under no circumstances should you ever call them Chicano or Chicana. They are Hispanic, and only occasionally, in delimited circumstances, will they allow themselves to be named Latino. In contrast, yet similarly, how many others in the USA refuse to be Hispanic just because Nixon made it a legal ethnicity in the 1970s? They are Latinos, and their identity is not hyphenated, whether the hyphen is lived (or theorized) as the “minus” of acculturation or as the “plus” of transculturation (see Pérez Firmat 1994).

The question of why there is no Yucatec “Maya” identity politics or cultural revitalization that compares or is homologous to those of Guatemala and Chiapas is therefore rendered transparent. Yet this question is also voluminously complex for precisely because of the variations in the histories of these ethnicities in these places and the ongoing historical negotiation of very different forces and agents. The essays here, for the most part do not address this question directly, but along the way of their analyses provide multiple answers.5

These articles turn away from “identity politics” in the narrow sense and instead turn to the “politics of identity” in a quotidian, less flashy, and more radical sense. These analyses interrogate “Maya identity” and the very categories of this and related identity labels. In so doing they demonstrate the geographic variation, historical instability, political mutability, socio-cultural diversity of the meanings of identity and its categories from 1500–1935.

In the first contribution, Matthew Restall analyses the use of the word “Maya” and related terms of identity in colonial documents to argue that this label was not used by the indigenous peoples of Yucatan as a marker of self identity at the time of Spanish conquest and colonization. On this basis he argues that the peoples of Yucatan did not have an explicit ethnic identity as Maya, although he suggests they did have an implicit sense of shared belonging across the different polities that are generally known as Maya.

In the second contribution, Wolfgang Gabbert argues in contradiction to widely held assumptions that Maya ethnicity was not a causal factor of the 19th century Caste War. Instead, he argues that the genesis of a Maya ethnicity occurred as a result of this military conflagration and, furthermore, that such ethnogenesis only occurred among a specific social group and not among all those of Yucatan who currently are designated as “Maya.”

In the third contribution, Paul Eiss inspects the educational project that the Revolutionary Governor Salvador Alvarado (1915–1918) sought to implant in the Yucatan as a way to transform “Indios” into “Mexicans.” Eiss shows elements of continuity between prior Porfrian educational projects and Alvarado’s, political problems rooted in the task of implementation, and the discursive-rhetorical elements
of the ideology embedded in the project. In this way, Eiss continues the questioning of the politics of identity categorization, including ethnicity, citizenship, and race, initiated by Restall and Gabbert.

In the fourth contribution, Ben Fallaw presents an ethnographic and comparative history of the reception by two famous Maya communities (Chan Kom and Kanxoc) of the Cardenas educational project (1929–1935). He argues against both the contemporary academic theory of subaltern resistance and the Yucatec discourse of the 1930s that attributed “failures” in the application and institutionalization of the national educational agenda to deficiencies in indigenous cultural mentality. Fallaw extends the questioning of the social and political use of identity categories of the three prior articles by discussing the practice of identity within real ethnographic contexts of lived historical situations.

The critical commentaries by Ueli Hostettler and Juan Castillo Cocom extend the discussion of “Maya identity” with hard-hitting questions, radical insights, and alternative views that break open the debate and amplify the significance of the articles. The contribution of the whole set, however, is based not only on the substantive analyses and critical questioning of ethnicity, but also due, first, to the innovation of the methodological mixing of the disciplines of anthropology and history and, second, to the implicit conceptual framework that the analyses share. The goal of this introduction, therefore, is to enlarge the value of the articles along these two axes with the aim of clarifying how this special issue is significant for Maya, Mexican, and Latin American scholars.

The Identity of Identity

It has long been recognized that the categories of identity in Latin America are problematic. Identity categories belong to disjunctive systems of classification that are based on contrasting criteria of race, culture, class, nation, community, etc. These disjunctions and confusions have always presented descriptive and analytical difficulties for comparative clarity across the regions of Mexico, Mesoamerica, and Latin America. Nonetheless, the non-Yucatec scholar is often surprised to find that uses and meanings of categories in Yucatan do not fit familiar models that are derived from other histories and regions.

Scholars are cognizant that while identific terms might remain constant, their values, meanings, and uses are variable in historical times and sociological spaces. However, once these identity labels enter into academic languages as cross-cultural concepts of comparison, we have a tendency to assume that they are unproblematic and can, therefore, be used to anchor both comparative and “non-comparative” analyses. As is well known, terms such as mestizo, catrin, ladino, “Indian,” are not
only unstable across the hemisphere, but even within different periods of the same region. In contrast, “materialist” notions of race and class seem to provide an identity anchorage for the “culturalist” series of labels, despite the fact that the former are also socio-historically variable.6

Thus, it must emphasized that the terms “Indian,” “ladino,” “mestizo,” “indigenous,” are not equivalent across the Maya world that currently spans at least seven nations. Even within the Maya region of Yucatan where cultural and linguistic diversity is often overlooked, if not erased, these terms do not have any stable meaning.7 Other pre-given terms, specifically “Maya,” have been assumed by academics to be unproblematic and are often used with little inquiry into their genealogy.

Ethnographers of Yucatan quickly learn to overcome and then forget their shock when they first hear a monolingual Maya speaker tell them that he or she is not a Maya, that all the Maya are long gone (they are the ones who built the pyramids), and, in the same breath, that the real Maya live in a town “just over there” where “they” speak the bił hach—or authentically true, “really real”—Maya.8 Yet if one goes “there,” “they” will tell you the same story about some others who live elsewhere, and who are indeed the real Maya.9 Further, persons from all over the socioeconomic and spatial spectrums will alternatively proclaim themselves Maya and protest total ignorance of the existence of any “Maya” living outside of the Palacio Cantón (i.e., the archaeology museum of the National Institute of Anthropology and History in Merida). Sometimes “non-speakers” will speak Maya; other times, Maya speakers feign total ignorance of the language. Clearly, there is an urgent and pressing need to dig deep into this murky terminology, practical usage, and sociolinguistic contexts that so baffle academics. We need a radical interrogation of the term Maya and of its usage as sign, symbol, substance, political codes, and boundary of identity and belonging. Clearly, the term “Maya” is itself an embattled zone of contestation of belonging, identity, and differentiation. The articles included here, with their historical and regional depth, provide a solid foundation for any future ethnographic and linguistic work.

The Basic Binary: Repetition and Difference in Approaches

In their substantive concern for identity, the following articles problematize ethnicity and domination by questioning agency in a manner distinct from general tendencies. The analytical scope is not solely shaped by a simple concern with the agency of subordinated actors (i.e., the “subaltern”), but also by the agency of those agents, including institutions, who are located “in,” “speak” from, or act in the name of power. Thus, the focus is on agency but within the framework of polity or of the public sphere of politics. This approach, in combination with a relatively new way
of inter-breeding history and anthropology, provides a major critique of the notion and assumption of continuity as an uncritical foundation for many Anglo North American anthropological studies of Yucatan. The articles break from paradigm of continuity by analyzing the linguistic and practical articulation of “Maya” in the polity within changing historical contexts.

This shift in analytical perspective may seem to be a familiar, even well-worn, lens for studying Indians in Mesoamerica. Indeed, the coupling of Maya and polity is related to the thematic of the “Maya and Spaniard” or “Maya and Ladino” and the more general “Indian and Spaniard” dichotomies that encompasses and have generated a significant and thriving corpus of research. However, the present essays make a subtle yet significant turn away from the inherited formulation based on this oppositional basic binary. How is the coupling of “Maya” and “polity” an analytical shift that problematizes ethnicity, domination, and agency in a new way?

In addition to the binary opposition of racial-ethnic groups (i.e., “Indian/Maya” versus “Spaniard/Ladino/White”) that posits pre-given, stable and enduring socio-cultural entities, there is a related binary that links and investigates “Indian/Maya” in relation to “the state” (colonial regime or nation-state). Until recently, the difference of these two coupled pairs did not signal a conceptual, analytical or investigative difference. The state was simply the apparatus and extension of Spaniard or Ladino/Criollo White. However, in the work, for example, of Smith (1990), this shifting of labels entailed a shifting of research questions and understandings: The ethnicity of Maya is no longer a presupposed and stable given (e.g., as a form determined by or reflecting class relations). Instead, it is investigated as something that was created historically in relation to state policies, practices, and dynamics. Ethnicity is therefore also not just a function of domination, since in this formulation “the state” is not merely a repressive mechanism nor a political imposition or oppression; the state is also enabling and productive. In this way, as Kay Warren (2001: 95) notes, Smith’s approach inaugurates a move beyond a binary and polarized conception of Maya ethnicity in Guatemala.

This questioning of ethnicity as neither an economic function of classes nor as domination and hegemony of state/elites can be pushed even further. The essays collected here pursue this trajectory by asking about the state, not in terms of domination or authority, but in terms of polity and government. In other words, these essays develop an inquiry into ethnicity that implicitly expresses the problem of governmentality. “Maya ethnicity” is then a strategic mode of governmentality that substantively shapes an emergent public sphere of polity. By polity I mean a public sphere of political belonging together of “Maya” and “non-Maya” groups, communities, and agencies—whether these be Spaniard, ladino, vecino, dzul, criollo, mestizo, white or even masewales and mayeros. Thus, the analyses of the governmental public sphere shows that the basic binary of dominant/subordinated groups
is an artifact of some other mechanisms of power and, therefore, is not a fundamental relation that structures the social field. The articles here manifest this general point and, thereby, exhibit an implicit thinking about governmentality through their treatment of the substantive objects of study.

Governmentality not only facilitates this shift, it also stimulates a fresh ethnographic focus and a renewed exploration of the articulation between history and anthropology. At this point in the discussion of governmentality it is necessary to detour through the new inter-mixing between the anthropological and historical study of “the Maya” of Yucatan.

“Anthropology and History in Yucatan”

The imperative of bringing anthropology and history together has been a persistent clarion call in both disciplines. Thus, the visions of and for a historical anthropology—in, for example, the work of Maitland, Evans-Pritchard, Clifford Geertz, Bernard Cohn, Marshall Sahlins, Jean and John Comaroff, Eric Wolf—vary in quite important and revealing ways in terms of the notions of “history” and of “culture” assumed. These different conceptions entail quite varied arguments about the appropriate methods of study. This type of debate about mixing concepts and methods is, of course, precisely what inhabits and constitutes the field of “ethnohistory” (e.g. Carmack 1971, 1972).

In the area studies of Yucatan this search for the proper marriage of these incestuous disciplines is manifested in the 1977 collection, *Anthropology and History of Yucatán*. Editor Grant Jones suggests that the chapters of the book “reflect both a growing concern among anthropologists with the conceptual and methodological integration of ethnographic and historical approaches and the dissatisfaction among some lowland Mayanists with the static approach of the folk-urban continuum in Yucatan” (Jones 1977: xi). While dissatisfied with Redfield, this collection did not, however, provide a sustained interrogation, much less a critical dismantling, of the Redfieldian paradigm. In part this has to do with the lack of any assessment of Redfield’s model of history that was embedded in his notion of culture. This absence was coupled with an acceptance of the generic attributes of culture given by Redfield’s theory. Thus, the call for a new integration of ethnographic and historical approaches did not really offer a new vision or paradigm of the “Maya of Yucatan” even though there was a shift in approach, analytical methodology, and formulation of questions.

Redfield’s ethnography and his theory of culture was indeed historical. Yet Redfield’s “history” was primarily theorized in and through space and spatial relationships.12 Thus, as exemplified in Jones, the call for history in ethnography and in
certain historical studies of the Maya, primarily colonial studies, is a call for a history that is temporal and includes change in time. The focus of research had been on charting structures and systems that endured in time within the same place. While shifts in structures and systems were noted, these changes were atemporal in that these writings of history offered a periodization of different synchronous portraits of a structure or structural whole without detailing the processes and dynamics of the transformation that lead from one to the other. The historical move that was inaugurated in the 1970s therefore entailed what can be called an ethnographic concern for the particular negotiations, dynamics, and events by which structures and systems “change”—that is, become undone and reformed anew in different shapes and configurations of power, agents, institutions, laws, communities, economic relations, and classes. But this focus on the process of change from one structure to another that introduced an ethnographic dimension to the historiography also entailed an eventual, and later, shift in the conception of the structure itself, from a solid, dense, structure to an increasingly unstable, never “complete,” always contested, fluid, fragile, momentary, even “nervous” configuration of forces. This has been the promise, in part, of the programmatic view expressed by Jones in his introduction, but which has been slowly elaborated by successive waves of deployments of the “ethnographic” as the space of the articulation of history and anthropology.

In the domain of the history of the Maya, there are two basic implicit models of the “ethnographic.” On the one hand, the work of Jones (1989, 1998) himself along with Nancy Farriss (1983, 1984, 1986), Sergio Quezada (1993), Bracamonte Sosa and Solis Robleda (1996) exemplify one conception. In these works the ethnographic is an approach to texts that aims at revealing the details of everyday life or of events, but always in relation to encompassing structures or systems. The ethnographic in these works is a style of narration, representation, and analysis of that which is “low” to the ground and yet focused on explaining overarching sociological processes and dynamics. It is therefore an historical style that is opposed to “big man” narratives and its attendant methodological individualism. When there are documents that allow for close attention to specific actors, these become real life dramas that exemplify broader processes. However, these works generally remained rooted to documents written in Spanish by the politically dominant groups. Despite the sophistication of their critical use of these documents, they therefore remained closely connected to the histories and historiography of the “conqueror.”

On the other hand, a second conception of the “ethnographic” emerged beginning in the late 1980s and 1990s. Stemming in part out of the emergence of a “new philological” school of colonial Mexican history (cf. Restall 2003) and the widespread concern for indigenous texts and voices, this alternative kind of ethnographic history turned to historical documents written in Maya. By paying attention to these native texts, history became ethnographic in a different way.
Exemplifying this approach in Yucatan is Clendinnen’s (1987) hermeneutic historiography that reinterprets the “Conquest” in search of the psycho-sociological motivations and mentalities of Spanish and Maya agents. This groundbreaking work fits into a broader intellectual moment that focused on the thematic of cross-cultural (mis)communication of colonial encounters. Clendinnen’s study in this topical or thematic sense thus formed part of, but as a critical counterpoint to, the diverse structuralist analyses of history and colonial contact that reached an apogee in, for example, Marshall Sahlins and Tzvetan Todorov.

Extending this “ethnographic” approach to gender is Pete Sigal’s (2000) queer reading of colonial Maya texts in search of sexual desire, sexuality, power dynamics, and the gendering of subjectivity. With a less controversial, if not “scandalous,” thematic mode of analysis, Restall’s work (1997, 1998) is nonetheless a polemical and significant contribution to Yucatec colonial historiography. The “ethnographic” in his histories of colonial Maya society is manifest in the close reading of native language texts as the source to develop the non-Spanish logics, meanings, values, and structural forms of indigenous or “Maya” society, on the one hand, and to profoundly critique the homogenization of those known today as “Maya” via the disclosure of cultural, class, and ethnic disjunctions, difference and diversity of the non-European peoples of Yucatan.

In this context, it needs to be understood that this concern for the “native” voice, perspective, and logic is ethnographic in a sense inherited from “traditional” cultural anthropology. While it has a certain parallel to the postcolonial studies concern for the subaltern voice and resistance,15 the theoretical and analytical frameworks of the “ethnographic” and the “subaltern” approaches are quite distinct. While both imply specific issues and kinds of questions that overlap, it can be said that the former references a set of more general thematic issues and the latter a set of more particular theoretical-analytical issues. Thus, subaltern studies tends to focus on questions of the rupture of social order (in revolution, rebellion, etc.), the construction of the nation and the national, and the problem of comprehending the diverse groups subordinated by forms of domination. In (heuristic, and perhaps exaggerated) contrast, the ethnographic, as manifested in this last discussed form of rapprochement of history and anthropology, is concerned with the cultural logics and mentalities of those “native” groups who are subordinated and how they both construct alternative cultural life-worlds and communities and, in turn, how these “inhabit” or live within the dominant society and larger social formations.

Thus, Restall’s essay here offers a polemical reading of the very meaning of the term “Maya,” within an ethnographic and philological framing. In an argument that converges with the independently formulated analyses of Schackt (2001) and Gabbert (2001), Restall analyzes the meaning of the term “Maya” for those who would be called “Maya” and their use of it as a category of social, economic, and political

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address. In short, Restall argues that those we call “Maya” did not themselves identity with this term, at least historically speaking. The term was most often used derogatorily to reference other “Indian” groups, classes and communities within a sociopolitical landscape of heterogeneous “Maya” peoples. It increasingly came to be used by “the Maya” in an ironic manipulation of the colonial languages of domination as a form of self-representation to colonial power. The aim of subordinated people who assume an identity imposed by power is precisely to negotiate the dynamics of domination and manipulate power. The implication is that the category of “Maya” was first and foremost a term constituted in the dynamics of power as the sociolinguistic articulation of domination-subordination. To return to an earlier comparison, Maya identity—or “Maya” as the identity of ethnicity—is like the ethnicity of “Hispanic” in the USA, i.e., an invented and politically constituted identity. It is an interpellation by the state, or here, the colonial regime, of its citizen/subjects as Hispanic or as Maya.

The idea of interpellation, which is discussed below in relation to governmen
tality, refers to a primarily linguistic-discursive dynamic by which the state “calls” or “hails” its subjects. This calling/hailing triggers a response in the individual who “turns” to it and, upon this acquiescent response to it, is thereby bestowed with a form of subjectivity as “citizen”/subject of the state. While in its original formulation, the idea of interpellation links to concepts of hegemony and domination in a top-down analysis of power; interpellation as the functioning of ideologies effects the domination of the state apparatus.

I suggest that the notion of interpellation can be reversed (with or without the encumbrance of the notion of ideology) in order to identify if not analyze the way in which subjects and citizens address or hail the state. Thus, Restall’s argument, as well as part of Fallaw’s essay, (see also Castañeda 1996: 259–297, 1998, 2003a; Castillo Cocom n.d.) would exemplify this interpellation of the state by its citizen-subjects. In the case of those who are called “Maya” by the colonial regime, Restall argues that the selective use of “Maya” is an acquiescence to the interpellative call of the state apparatus, but in a conscious calculation and gambit with power that in turn puts ideological and pragmatic demands on the colonial regime to enact and embody a specific mode of governance.

Interpellation therefore is not a narrow, one-way, top-down, unitary force of domination, but a more complicated dynamic with multiple vectors in which the subject-citizen also “hails” the state to enact specific functions and assume certain roles. In recent discussion of the limits of Maya identity politics in Yucatán, Juan Castillo Cocom (n.d.) astutely analyzes how Maya politicians were “cultivated” by the PRI within a double system of political gambit that both enables and contains identity politics. Castillo Cocom thereby not only provides ethnographic data to support this innovative twisting of the concept into a multi-vectorial interpellation
that shifts our understanding of domination, but offers an evidential model for what Restall suggests about the strategies of colonial period “Maya.”

The analysis of the invention of the “Maya” by Restall in his contribution here, and in the related arguments by Schackt (2001) and Gabbert (2001; and this issue), will no doubt disturb some readers as it upsets our inherited assumptions of the stability and continuity of the Maya as an ethnic-racial unity. It may also upset those who have a polarized, either-or understanding of “constructivist” and “essentialist” arguments about “identity.” On the one hand, this polarization confuses and conflates several distinguishable phenomena: the substantive contents of culture, the labels of identity of that cultural content, and the processes of identification enacted (and experienced) by individual persons or collectivities that establish meaningful relations between their selves, those cultural labels, and those cultural contents.

On the other hand, there is also an unfortunate politicization that has fueled another conflation of ideas. Essentialism, cultural continuity, and constructivism are three sets of ideas that no doubt overlap in their concerns, yet they are not opposed in an irresolvable oppositions. Instead, it is suggested here that they less conflict than deal with different phenomena. Consider that essentialism is “insider” understandings of the origins, nature, and meanings of cultural contents that are indexed by identity labels; it is thus a process of self-identification through the symbolization of identity labels. Cultural continuity is a set of theoretical assumptions about the essential continuity of cultural contents and identities; it is thus an ahistorical model of an unchanging unity (and reversible sameness) of identity and contents. Constructivism is a series of diverse theoretical assumptions that cultural contents and identities are constructed in and through specific historical contexts and dynamics; thus, it is an analysis of processes of identification in terms of their different meanings and values created by sociocultural activities. In other words, constructivism is less a critique, much less an invalidation, of essentialism; it is, afterall, an explanation of essentialism. But, constructivism is indeed a trenchant critique of models of continuity (regardless of whether they are associated with a philosophical or a cultural essentialism).

This position, therefore, would view of Ted Fischer and others (1999, 2001: 243; cf. Castañeda 1999) whose self-appointed defense of cultural essentialism and cultural continuity in the face of an imagined threat by constructivism as partially misdirected. There is, however, agreement with Fischer that those constructivist arguments that reduce cultural content to labels and/or processes of identification to “resistance” are woefully inadequate (see essays herein). The problem of choosing between essentialism and constructivism is a here viewed as a ruse and certainly the solution is not cultural continuity. Indeed, in the registers of both politics and academic epistemology, the claims of “continuity”-based identity and the claims of “resistance”-generated identity are two sides of the same coin. Here it is crucial to
note that the significance of essentialism and continuity have radically different values and significance in Yucatan than in Guatemala or all other locations in “the world of the Maya.” The critiques and counter-critiques of the Pan-Maya movement give an entirely different political substance and scholarly value to “continuity” in Guatemala than in Yucatan if not also elsewhere in the “Maya world.” Those who are referenced as Maya in Yucatan may identify themselves as “Maya” all the while recognizing both continuity and discontinuity of cultural contents. The “essence” therefore is not in content nor in the unity of the identity label and its content, but rather in the identity itself, i.e., in the value of the identity, the contexts of identification, and the activity of identifying.

From this comparative and conceptual detour, we can return to the question of the “ethnographic” in the different historiographies of Yucatan. In the case of the 19th century historiography of Yucatan, it is not the use of Maya texts that signaled an integration of ethnography to the writing of history. In the study of this period, the most prominent issue has been the Caste War, a topic that has been continually addressed from a set of enduring questions that include such seemingly “simple” issues as when did it start, who fought it, why did it begin, and when did it end, if indeed it did end? (Reed 1964, 1997; González Navarro 1970; Dumond 1977, 1985, 1997; Suárez Molina 1978; Sullivan 1984, 1989, 1997; Bracamonte Sosa 1984; Rugeley 1996, 2001a, 2001b; Hostettler 1996) The fundamental hinge on which these interpretative debates move is precisely the interpretive “reading” of Yucatec Maya sources (documents and oral narrative). Although by overt military reckoning the Caste War began in 1847 and ended in 1902, not a few anthropologists want to enlarge and conflate “Maya” resistance to Spanish colonization with armed struggle against Yucatecan armies, and both with verbal refusal to accept de facto military defeat at the hands of a Mexican national army as a singular, continuous and seamless fabric of manifest autonomy. These literal and oral texts and the anthropological interpretation of Maya viewpoints, logics, and motivations based on them operate as a counterpoint to the dominant historiography written from non-Maya, Yucatec perspectives which discursively and narratively diminish military conflation into more controllable semantics. On the one hand, it is this polyvocal, interpretative debate that latches onto the diverse meanings of the multiple actors that makes the history of the 19th century ethnographic in a strong sense of the notion. On the other hand, because one of the primary objects of study and historical contexts of this period of study is a war that occurred over, at least, a fifty year period, there is a dominant historical particularist concern for the specificity of events, actors, and contexts. This historical particularism, especially when oriented sociologically toward social processes rather than toward the actions of “big men,” is “ethnographic” and makes the historiography ethnographic in the substance of its investigations.
In this double sense, the historiography of the Caste War and/or of the 19th century has been ethnographically quite rich with a weighty literature that continues to grow around an essential set of questions: Was the war a race, class, ethnic, culture, or economic war, struggle of rebellion, or an already prophesied civilizational revindication? Who were the Maya that fought against the white Yucatecos and why? What were the different Maya groups and polities and what was the social, economic, cultural, religious, and ideological bases of their communities and relationships to other Maya and non-Maya groups?

A critical genealogy of the debate on the Caste War in Yucatan that deconstructs the historiography along the lines of Rus’s (1983; cf. 1994) critique of the 19th century Chiapas Caste War or the Rebellion of Quisiteil, is long overdue and necessary. For example, in Indian Christ, Indian King, Bricker reviews the literature on the Quisiteil Rebellion to find that most of the evidence suggests that it is an event fabricated out of criollo fears. This does not impede her analysis of the logic of the “event” as exemplary of Maya cosmology, prophecy-history, and cultural resistance, and points to the need for some serious reflection on our academic imagining of the Maya. What does this Caste War historiography or other histories of Maya Rebellion say about “us” and our will to know the Maya? How do the shifting interpretations correlate to the socioeconomic and political history of academic institutions, discourses, agents, funding priorities, locations of “enunciation,” and international relations framed in “regional” and “area” studies?

While this critical-reflexive project of analyzing our academic discourses is left urgent and still pending, In his essay Gabbert offers an important and revisionist contribution to the Caste War historiography. With a dramatic reversal of perspectives he not only pursues “the Maya” among those polities and communities that made war on or had an antagonized relationship with white Yucatec society, but he asks about the “Maya” victims of Cruzob Maya and about the “Maya” allies of the “white” Yucatecos. He therefore inspects systems of social classification in order to differentiate the diversity of those known today as “Maya” peoples, the historically shifting categories of their identification, and their socioeconomic and political locations in a complex, fluid, and long-lasting event. In distinction to one of the widely held assumptions that the conflict was an ethnic-racial confrontation, Gabbert concludes that the ethnogenesis of “Maya” as ethnicity and ethnic groups was a consequence of the Caste War, not its precondition nor its substantive cause.

In addition, Gabbert critiques the academic tendency to conflate diverse groups into monolithic aggregates (race, culture, class or community) and to reify the categories of social labeling. Here, Gabbert’s concern for the “contrasting experiences” of actors denotes an ethnographic attitude and approach to reality. His analysis of the social classification is an insightful and skilled intervention in an old anthropological problem, and is innovative in that he takes both a regional and an historical
view of classification. In this way his analysis supplements and even overcomes the weaknesses of those ethnographic “descriptions” (actually analytical constructions) of a system of classification for a whole society based on the evidence generated in a year or two of fieldwork in a single town. Although this approach has its own specific weaknesses, Gabbert’s essay, along with Restall’s questioning of the use of identity labels, will no doubt rejuvenate a tired focus of study by stimulating new research questions and problems as they contest and supplement recent ethnographic work on this topic.

The “ethnographic” in the historical studies of the period from the end of the Porfiriato, through the Constitutional period, to the presidency of Cardenas, has a different tone than previously discussed. These periods of historical analysis are, of course, privileged objects of study because they are invested with the weighty presence of the modern nation-state. That is, both Mexicans and non-Mexican scholars seek out these periods as privileged objects that can reveal the emergence, nature, problems, dynamics, identity, homogeneity, heterogeneity, modernity, continuity, and future of México. These historical studies have the flavor of the ethnographic in that they are usually grounded on an abundance of documentary sources to provide rich details of events, actors, and dynamics, which in turn are used to portray macro-processes, structures, or systems.

Fallaw’s essay is an incorporation of the ethnographic into an historical study of cultural issues. In a comparative study he analyzes the differences between the actualization of the Revolutionary educational program in two different rural Maya communities. In a study of the famous communities, Kanxoc and Chan Kom, he shows how the local reception of federal teachers between 1929–1935 was not a question of resistance to external power. In fact, he argues that the hegemony of the state was accepted and invited into the community, but on conditions established by the community. When these conditions were contradicted there was resistance not to state hegemony and “hispanization” but to personalities and actions of specific teachers. Maya identity, Fallaw concludes, was not at risk and never destabilized by the introduction of the educational system. Therefore the governmental agents of educational reform needed to create valid justifications for the failures of the program as a whole. A discourse espousing the antagonism and recalcitrance “of the Maya” easily provided recognizable scapegoats. Fallaw’s conclusions, like those of Restall and Gabbert, have polemical implications for our understanding of “the Maya” in terms of “identity” and of their diverse relations with Merida-based society. Fallaw’s community-based history provides an ethnographic questioning of state hegemony and the analytics of resistance.

Eiss’ work also participates in a broadly conceived “new” culture history movement of Mexico. Like Fallaw, he is concerned with education and its place in governmental processes of incorporating indigenous Maya into state and nation. Eiss
provides a kind of dual analysis of Yucatan Governor Salvador Alvarado’s educational project (1915–1918) as both a discourse of state governmentality and as a practice of its implementation. On the one side, his concern is to trace the key tropes, logics, and assumptions of the government’s vision of the indigenous that informed the project of educating the Indian. Thus, he details the connections and discursive use of notions such as redemption, patria, regeneration, indigenous, civilize, and spiritual growth that constitute a specific cultural vision of the actors representing state power. Although the focus is not on native or subaltern views, meanings, resistances, or adaptive responses to this discourse, Eiss’ project is intrinsically “ethnographic” in its analysis its “cultural” form. This may disturb some readers who define ethnography and ethnographic analysis with native “voices.” Here, however, Eiss avoids that ventriloquism of representing the subaltern voice, in part due to a lack of sources, but primarily because he wants to provide a critical ethnography of power and hegemony. On the other side, his discussion of the failure of the implementation of this educational project is solidly historical. He charts the social and political relationships and viewpoints of the key players who sought to further or to block Alvarado. Here again, we have a political ethnography cast in the overt genre of history. While Eiss does not address the experience of those targeted by the education, his work opens a space for rethinking the articulation of Maya identity in relation to projects of the state.

“Polarized Ethnicity” and the Governmentality of the Public Sphere

These ethnographic histories amount to a shift in the approach to the Maya of Yucatan. On the one hand they respond to the long-reiterated call for an integration of ethnography and history by offering detailed historical ethnographies and revisionary interpretations of the “things of the Maya.” On the other hand, they break from the inherited questions and issues in the history and anthropology of Yucatan. Each has implicitly developed what can be called an ethnographic sensibility that generally manifests itself as the rethinking of the relationships between the traditional object of study, the “Maya,” and the encompassing society. Specifically, all the essays share a concern with re-thinking ethnicity and domination.

Restall, Gabbert, Eiss, and Fallaw have re-cast the articulation of the Maya and state hegemony by seeking to identify, in different ways, not so much the subordinated and marginalized “voice” of the Maya, but the agency of social actors. Too often the Maya are analytically positioned in our interpretations as passive and docile subjects who simply undergo processes that are “externally” introduced. Or, a very specific and delimited kind of agency is asserted, that of “resistance.” Thus, one of the enabling assumptions of notions of hegemony and domination is that
one group imposes itself on another group that is socioculturally marked with difference. It is thus an “external” group, class, structure of power, ideology/ies, forms of knowledge or culture, social institutions, etc. that dominates. And, the agency of “the Maya” is envisioned and contained within a monolithic, unidirectional, and hollow concept of resistance. The entire historiographic construction of the Caste War is premised on these assumptions of an almost Manichean binary of identity and a restricted agency. This is also evident in the ethnographic understanding of the Maya and is exemplified, from Redfield to Reed and beyond, in the fetishization of the (Western-modern) “road” as the uncontrolled invasion by and imposition of Western civilization on “Maya culture.”18 Here, the essays pursue Maya agency in a more complex fashion, neither as staged “voices” nor as subaltern resistance, but as diverse forms of manipulation, adaptation, selective borrowing, negotiation, inversion, measured acceptance, calculated rejection, and revalorization of the languages and mechanisms of government.

The following essays outline an implicit hypothesis: Ethnicity is a mode of governmentality. One mode of governmentality is ethnicity, but not as unmediated, unilateral, “foreign,” or unequivocal expression of state power and hegemony. Rather, ethnicity-governmentality is the strategy by which a public sphere of polity is created in between the state and the social (or civil society; i.e., the populations and life-worlds of those to be governed). In this model, “Maya ethnicity” is neither a pre-given, substantive identity and belonging nor is it an artificial imposition of the state. Instead, it is a mediated and arbitrated “middle” zone created through mutual, if also unequal, accommodation and, often antagonized, negotiation of interests.

This hypothesis suggests a different way to characterize or summarize the essays in a language that the authors themselves do not use. Thus, Restall charts the scope of this governmental use of “Maya” as a double interpellation in the colonial period. Gabbert, in his argument of ethnogenesis, surveys the reconfiguration of one system of governmental ethnicity into another modality that formed the basis of the 20th century ethnic landscape of Yucatan. Eiss analyzes the logic, mechanisms, and failed deployment of an educational governmentality that sought to transform the “Maya ethnicity” inherited from the 19th century. Fallaw shows governmental programs of education as an entangled and fraught space of political belonging together in which a double interpellation of Maya ethnicity and government is enacted. The advantage of these summaries is that it provides a new way to “re-think the binary models of ethnicity.” In short, unlike Guatemala and Chiapas, ethnicity is not polarized in Yucatan. As impossible as it seems, the view of ethnicity as governmentality shows that “Maya ethnicity” is not polarized against another ethnicity—such as Ladinos or Mestizos. There are two pieces of evidence, both from systems of social classification, that further suggest this idea.
On the one hand, as any student of Yucatan will tell you, those that are known as “Maya” in anthropology books and tourist discourses use a variety of self-identific terms that are based on cross-cutting criteria of class, gender, and language, but not ethnicity. Thus, a male “Maya” might be Maya, but more likely masewal, otzil, humilde, mayero, catrín, and mestizo. Note that a female “Maya” is a mestiza because she dresses like a Maya, speaks Maya, and lives “Maya culture.” Yet, when a “white” Yucatec woman dresses “like” a Maya (i.e., like a “mestiza”) for formal public events, she is neither Maya nor Mestiza. On the other hand, there is the well known problem of how to refer to the 20th century non-Maya, “white” Yucatecos: 19th century terms such as criollo and vecino are no longer legally valid and no term equivalent to Guatemala’s ladino replaced these categories. Since Mayas are mestizos and non-Maya mestizos are Mexicans (not Yucatecos), this leaves open the term of identifying the non-Maya Yucatecos. While dzul is a Maya term once given to foreigner and to criollos/vecinos, it is now an ascription of elevated socioeconomic, respected cultural or foreigner status; currently it does not refer to the collectivity of “non-Maya” Yucatecos and was never self-identific term for this group. “White” is also a possibility, but not all non-Maya are “white”; some are mestizo (in “racial-ethnic” and cultural terms) and even consider themselves as such at the same time that they do not identify as Mestizo (in the sense of the national ideology of Mexican mestizaje) since this term of identity refers to non-Yucatec Mexicans. Further, while “white” may be a term of self-identity among the oldest elite families, it does not much enter into contemporary public discourse as a term of self-identification. Thus, “white” Yucateco has mostly becomes a default term used today to refer to the racial-ethnic relations of earlier centuries and by anthropologists as a quick and easy marker to identify non-Maya, non-Criollo, non-Mestizo, non-Mayero, urban or rural Yucatecan peoples and society. In the final analysis, not all Yucatecos are “Maya” and some “Maya” are Maya, but all are Yucatecos.

This leads us to recognize that these “non-Maya” terms of identity (whether they reference “Mayas” or “non-Mayas”) operate outside the shared public sphere of politics per se and reference lived sociocultural realities. They are substantive identities and social belongings unlike the formal, yet not juridical, umbrella “ethnicity” of Maya that operates in political space as an empty signifier. This statement however does not mean that there is no substantive content for those who are called “Maya” whether or not they identify themselves as such; nor does it mean that other terms do not operate in a political register or have no political uses only “real” cultural content. Thus, at the level of social nomenclature, “Maya ethnicity” does not exist, for example, as once postulated for Guatemala, in a binary antithesis with another ethnic-racial group or identity. It is neither a pre-given stable entity nor an “inverse image” or mirror-reflection of ideological distinction. Instead, Maya ethnicity is a malleable and fluid substance that is manipulated in the governmental articulation
of citizens and state in the Yucatec polity, i.e., in a (hierarchized) public sphere of political belonging together.

In turn, this rethinking of ethnicity through governmentality entails a reconceptualization of power. Specifically domination and hegemony are resituated in a different theoretical space charted by the creative application of Althusser’s interpellation and Foucault’s governmentality. While the essays that follow not use these languages of analysis, their arguments and data of the suggest the utility of this theoretical framing of both agency and hegemony. Although Foucault’s governmentality was indeed crafted as way to subvert and reformulate the Marxist and Liberal problematics of the state, Althusser’s notion of interpellation was designed to consolidate the Gramscian analysis of domination and hegemony. Significantly, the reconceptualization of interpellation offered here turns hegemony/domination inside out in a double articulation.

Maya Modernity

The approach to Maya ethnicity expressed by the authors suggests a reinterrogation of the notions of modernity and continuity in Yucatan and Yucatec studies. The collected essays locate those who would be called Maya as co-contemporary and integrated parts of regional society. In other words, these authors do not use a split chronotope or bifurcated model of time and space that positions the Maya allochronically in a savage-slot of cultural difference.21 It is this splitting of the temporality and spaces of “the Maya” from those of the non-Maya civil society and polity that constitutes the basis of the binary opposition of Maya tradition as intrinsically exterior to modernity (or the “cultural present” of the colonial period).

The split chronotope is most clearly expressed in Redfield’s folk-urban continuum of tradition-modernity: Although the Maya are physically located in spatially contiguous places in co-terminous temporality to those of the world of “Hispanic civilization,” they are in a different “time zone” of sociocultural development, that is, a “space” construed as “temporal” within a spatial continuum of different “regions” of “uneven” civilizational “refuge” (as it were). Despite the decades of critique of Redfield’s model, these ideas continue to thrive on Yucatan’s rocky limestone soil and in its anthropological texts. These ideas manifest in and inhabit virtually every study that is devoted to depicting how the “Maya-are-Modernizing” (see Castañeda 1996: 35–67). The trope of the Modernizing Maya is a metaphor that Redfield created in the 1930s (see Redfield and Villa Rojas 1934: 4–6). The basic idea is that the Maya modernize to the extent that they create cultural and physical proximity to Merida. The corollary is that to the extent that Maya remain “located” in these “traditional” spaces, often quintessentially defined via the milpa, they remain
both authentically Maya and traditionally non-Modern. This trope of always already modernizing remains a powerful prism for imagining the relationship between Maya and transnational cultures even if Merida, as the specific sign of modernity, is substituted with analogues such as Coca-Cola, tourism, Cancun, the “road,” television or cable news, Wal-Mart, Sanborns (an old and famous Mexican national restaurant chain), cell phones, and Nike shoes.

This set of essays, however, introduces a radical rupture away from Redfield and the modernizing trope. They point to the profound, multiple, and historically longstanding interconnections between “Maya” of all types and the Yucatec (and historiographic) center of the universe, i.e., Merida. This is not simply a political articulation of center and peripheries, but a fundamental and enabling condition of transcultural commingling, exchange, and self re-fashioning of cultural forms and belonging. The implications are that “the Maya” are not modernizing, but rather that they are already modern.

Thus, there is an already existing Maya modernity that is “there” on the ground. It is evident in the ethnographic materials presented by Redfield (1950) and by Redfield and Villa Rojas (1934), even though it is effaced under the theoretical agenda of establishing the “folk culture” concept and the modeling of acculturation. Yet, the appendices of Redfield and Villa Rojas (1934) demonstrate deeply entrenched processes of transculturation (cf. Ortiz 1995). I give Ortiz’s term transculturation a particular inflection to refer to the ongoing dynamic of cultural re-invention of the collective self via “cross-cultural” exchange, borrowing, selective adaptation, and re-fashioning. Thus, the idea of Maya modernity does not exclude the continuity of cultural logics, motivations, forms, styles, modes of thought and behavior. Rather, such continuity is intrinsically a part of transcultural refashioning and reinvention.

The rupture with Redfield thus implicitly asserts an understanding of Maya modernity and elements of continuity within processes of transcultural reinvention. These authors thereby imply a rupture with the notion of continuity as it is used to argue for the ahistorical and atemporal continuity of “Maya culture” as a polarized tradition external to that of modernity and encompassing Yucatec society. It can be further noted that the value of the trope of “continuity” in Yucatec studies is not the same as its academic and political uses in Guatemala. In presenting analyses that presuppose the rejection of models and assumptions of continuity, this collection of essays offer a significant lead for anthropologists to follow.

While these essays, including the commentaries, do not exhaust the formulation of research questions and problems for either the field of history or of anthropology, they do offer a significant contribution to Yucatec Maya studies. The analyses are polemical and readers may debate the interpretations. Nonetheless, the value of these works can be measured in a variety of ways. The break from the Redfieldian paradigm in a new rapprochement of anthropology and history is a major contribu-
tion. They open up a space for new approaches, new questions, and new analyses that should contribute to the moving away from the shadow that Redfield cast over the peninsula seventy years ago.

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Notes

1The title of this special issue and introduction derives from a play on the title of Morris Steggerda’s 1941 study called, Maya Indians of Yucatán. Steggerda, an anthropometrist who collaborated with Charles Davenport on race-crossing in Jamaica, was a colleague of Redfield and did studies of metabolism, soil fecundity, hair styles, architecture, family histories and pedigrees, fingerprints, gossip, and anthropometry all to discover the true and essential identity of the race of the Maya. While eschewing Steggerda’s goal of defining the racial diagnostics, these essays appreciate Steggerda’s rigorous concern for the diversity of elements that comprise identity, as well as his ultimate failure to provide a synthetic definition.

2A first draft of these articles were presented at the session, “Rethinking Maya Identity in Yucatan, 1500–1940,” organized by Ben Fallaw at LASA 2000.

3The exhibition was held at the Durand Art Institute at Lake Forest College, November 30 to December 12, 1999 (see Castañeda, forthcoming 2004; Castañeda, Fumero and Breglia 1999).

4The concept of savage-slot is from Michel Ralph-Trouillot.

5See Castillo Cocom (n.d.) for an explicit treatment of this issue.

6See de la Cadena (2000, 2001), Klor de Alva (1995, 1996) and JLAA special issues on mestizajes (vol. 2 no. 1) and Guatemalan ethnicity (vol. 6 no. 2 and vol. 8 no. 1) for recent analyses of ethnic-cultural and
class constructions of racial identities.


Frankly, no cultural anthropologist or linguist of Yucatán has yet done a serious, sustained and rigorous analysis of this discursive phenomenon. All Yucatecologos know about it and on occasion make little references to it, but no one of us has produced a significant study of it and of its relationship to other historical, political, cultural, social and economic dynamics and processes. Studies of the internal regions or microregions of the peninsula that analyze the correlations of and differences between sociolinguistic practices, dialects, identities, sets of social classifications, and stereotyping is distressingly absent and urgently needed. Such work could be productively connected to questions raised by Castillo Cocom in this issue regarding various contemporary slang identities.

Interestingly, Restall’s analysis tells us that this dynamic has been always the case, at least since the Spaniards arrived.

For examples of the continuity of “continuity” in Mesoamerican and Mayanist studies, see Kintz (1990), Nash (1993), Fischer (1999), Jones (1977, 1989).

The literature on governmentality has grown since Foucault’s statements were published in Burchell, Gordon and Miller (1991; cf. essays by Gordon and other contributors). Key secondary literature include Hindess (1996), Rose (1999), Dean (1999), the special 1993 issue of Economy and Society (vol. 22), and Barry, Osborne and Rose (1996).

See: Strickon’s (1965) critique of Redfield’s spatial model; Goldkind’s (1965, 1966) re-analysis of conflict in Chan Kom; Castañeda’s (1996: 35–67) re-reading of Redfield’s theory of folk culture and modernity; Kearney’s (1995) critical re-assessment of Redfield’s theory of the folk society within a reconceptualization of peasantry; and Castañeda’s (2003) critique of Stocking’s portrayal of Redfield as “Boasian.”

The concern for the binary interface of “Maya and Spaniard” is present in García Bernal (1978) and Patch’s (1985, 1993) studies of macro-processes based in Spanish language documents. Thompson’s (1999) “ethnographic” study of the Maya cultural logics is based on a reading of Spanish cabildo sources.


The three “fields” of postcolonial, subaltern, and cultural studies, which are different projects despite their intersections (e.g., see Mignolo 2000), have not had a significant reception in Yucatán. Neither Yucatecan scholars nor non-peninsular scholars of Yucatán (i.e., from México, USA, or Europe) have developed research from these approaches.

Although interpellation is a concept introduced by Althusser (1971), Sawyer (2002) argues that a more generalized notion of interpellation derives from Michel Pêcheux’s in-mixing of Lacan’s psychoanalytics of language with Althusser’s notion of ideology and that this was later popularized in British Marxism’s emergent cultural studies. Sawyer argues that the resultant notion has come to inhabit a generic conception of discourse that is erroneously attributed to Foucault.

Hervik’s (1999: 23–57) study of classification is the most recent of a series of ethnographies about the same subregion of Yucatán (the Puuc) that have presented information from one or another Puuc community as if it pertained to the whole of Yucatán. This has contributed to the distorted perception of the uniformity of the Yucatec peoples.

Redfield’s 1950 text actually presents the complexity of Maya agency as involving not only resistance and acculturation, but selective adaptation and refashioning of western modernity. Chan Kom builds a road in the jungle to make contact with the Anglo-Americans at Chichén Itzá. Thus, the anthropologically stereotyped image of the road as the intervention of modernity (e.g., Burns 1992) is an inversion of the value given to the road by Redfield. Significantly, although Redfield cannot escape the assumptions of acculturation, his 1950 and his co-authored 1934 ethnographies provide materials and
evidence for analyzing the cultural contact and encounter as processes of transculturation (see Castañeda 1996: 35–67). Thus, a particular kind of "mis-reading" of Redfield has occurred over the last 70s years. Similarly, Sullivan’s (1989) study elaborates in detail the creative and independent agency of Maya peoples, yet a dominant interpretation of his book reduces and romanticizes all these acts and manifestations of agency within an enduring (Cruzob) Maya resistance to modernity and western civilization. The conclusion to Reed’s (1964) study of the Caste War is perhaps the most eloquent statement of this reductionist and romanticist interpretation. In the manner of anthropological worshipping of the exotic underdog, Reed argues that although “the Maya” were “never conquered” and “always resisted” foreign domination, he equates tourism as the 20th century evil invader that may indeed “finally conquer” and assimilate the Maya to Western modernity-civilization.

19See Casaús Arzú (1992, 2001) for a discussion of Guatemala’s “hidden” racial identities.

20While social classification seems a worn topic, these complications suggest an urgent need for new studies that analyze classification and stereotypes to other processes, for example, of power, governmentality, transnational media, and migration.

21This split chronotope might remind one of Bhabha’s “time-lag” and colonial ambivalence that operates in the constitution of modernity. These are, however, not resonant or parallel.